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IS LABOR ARBITRATION LAWLESS?
ARIANA R. LEVINSON, ERIN O'HARA O'CONNOR,
& PAIGE MARTA SKIBA*
ABSTRACT

Labor arbitrationis often viewed as a more peaceful, productive, and
private alternative to workplace strikes and violence. On the other
hand, statutory laws are intended to protect all workers, and contract
law default rules and rules of interpretationoften serve a protectiverole
that could be harmful if ignored in this private dispute resolution
setting. To provide more insight into how arbitrators decide labor
disputes, we utilize our newly crafted data set of hundreds of labor
arbitrationawards spanninga decade. Unlike prior datasets, our data
are more inclusive: they include both published and unpublished
awardsas well as cases decided by non-AAA arbitratorsand industrial
boards, enabling a fuller-and thus potentially more credible-study
of differing types of labor arbitration. We find-counter to previous
research-that the vast majority of awards do not cite to external
authority such as statutes, administrative authorities, or case law, or
to secondary sources. Yet, our awards provide little evidence that
arbitratorsexplicitly declined to address a statutory issue raised by one
of the parties. These findings indicate there is perhaps much more room
for labor arbitrators to refer to external authority in their decisionmaking. Our results also indicate that reference to governing law
depends on factors like attorney representation and service provider
guidance. If so, our study has potential implications for the structure
and desirability of arbitrationfor labor disputes as well as for other
types of arbitration, including employment, consumer, and securities
arbitrations. The inherent tension between peaceful, quick, private
dispute resolution and the risks of potential lawlessness might be
greater for the resolution of statutory claims, and if so, our study has
implicationsfor the desirabilityand structureof the arbitrationof such
claims. For example, examination of external authority and written
reasoning could be required for the binding resolution of statutory
claims in labor arbitration. Moreover, our more inclusive study
indicates that there remains an inherent tension between peaceful,
quick dispute resolution and the risks of potential lawlessness.
More broad studies are warranted.
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For several decades, arbitration and labor scholars have debated
whether arbitrators should consider external authority when deciding
labor grievances' as well as whether and the extent to which they in
fact rely on external authority.2 Labor arbitration is often viewed as a
more peaceful, productive, and private alternative to workplace strikes
and disruption of commerce.' Under this perspective, harmonious
employment relations are fostered by enabling labor and management
to bargain for and create employment terms and protections that best
suit the workplace and their collective interests without the
constraints or interference of external laws or expectations.4 Notably,
several respected labor arbitrators contend that arbitrators should not
refer to authority external to the governing contract (the collective
bargaining agreement), even when the mandate of the contract is
contrary to external authority. 5 On the other hand, statutory
employment laws are intended to protect all workers, not just the
unionized, and contract and tort rules often serve their own protective
role that could be harmful if ignored in a private dispute resolution
setting.' Without resorting to external authority, arbitration could
become "lawless."
Our recently published article addresses the first issue of whether
labor arbtirators consider external authority.7 In this article, we turn
to exploration of the larger, and in some ways more significant, issue
of whether labor arbitration is lawless. As reported in the first article,
we find that contrary to previous research, external authority is not
cited or referenced by a huge majority of awards, and we rely heavily
* Levinson: Professor of Law, University of Louisville Brandeis School of Law;
O'Hara O'Connor: Dean and McKenzie Professor, Florida State University College of Law;
Skiba: Professor of Law, Vanderbilt University. We thank Carlie Malone and Sam Miller for
performing some statistical analyses for this article and each student research assistant who
worked on this project, either coding awards or researching the arbitration literature. We
thank Steve Ware for providing feedback on an initial draft.
1. See Bernard D. Meltzer, Ruminations About Ideology, Law, and Labor Arbitration,
in THE ARBITRATOR, THE NLRB AND THE COURTS 1 (Dallas L. Jones ed., 1967), reprinted in
34 U. CHI. L. REV. 545, 557 (1967).
2. See Harry T. Edwards, Arbitration of Employment Discrimination Cases: An
Empirical Study, in ARBITRATION-1975: PROCEEDINGS OF THE 28TH ANNUAL MEETING,
NATIONAL ACADEMY OF ARBITRATORS, 70 (Barbara D. Dennis & Gerald G. Somers eds.,

Bureau

of

Nat'l

Affairs

1976),

https://naarb.org//proceedings/pdfs/1975-59.pdf

[https://perma.c/T2XZ-A37Y]; see also Patricia A. Greenfield, How Do Arbitrators Treat
External Law?, 45 INDUS. & LAB. REL. REV. 683, 693 (1992).
3.

STEPHEN J. WARE, PRINCIPLES OF ALTERNATIVE DISPUTE RESOLUTION 197-98 (3d

ed. 2016).
4. United Steelworkers of Am. v. Warrior & Gulf Navigation Co., 363 U.S. 574, 578
(1960) ("A major factor in achieving industrial peace is the inclusion of a provision for
arbitration of grievances in the collective bargaining agreement.").

5. See infra Section
6.

h.A.

Clyde W. Summers, Employment at Will in the United States: The Divine Rights of

Employers, 3 U. PA. J. LAB. & EMP. L. 65, 70-72 (2000).
7. See generally Ariana R. Levinson, Erin O'Hara O'Connor, & Paige Marta Skiba,
Predictabilityof Arbitrators'Relianceon ExternalAuthority?, 69 AM. U. L. REV. 1827 (2020).
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on and build upon the ideas expressed in our first article to explore the
issue of lawlessness herein.8
The question of whether arbitration is lawless was posed by
Christopher Drahozal's seminal 2006 article. In exploring this
question, Drahozal tested the empirical assertion that arbitrators do
not follow the law 0 by reviewing empirical studies of labor and other
arbitration awards, surveys administered to arbitrators, and award
reversal rates. He found that "[o]verall, the evidence on whether
arbitrators follow the law in their awards is inconclusive."" One factor
to consider in assessing whether arbitration is lawless is awards'
citation (or lack thereof) to external authority, such as statutes, cases,
and administrative regulations-generally considered to be law. 2
This tension between peaceful, private resolution of labor disputes
and potential lawlessness was less obvious when the U.S. Supreme
Court guaranteed workers
could litigate statutory claims
notwithstanding arbitration provisions in collective bargaining
agreements.1 3 Today, however, collective bargaining agreements can,
and some do, effectively require arbitration of unionized workers'
statutory claims, 4 creating what seems like at least a conceptual
tension regarding the role of external authority in labor arbitration.
Arbitration is not subject to the same due process standards; 5 parties

8. See id. at 1881. Our reliance on the initial article means that text in this article may
be similar or the same as some text in the prior article. We have indicated reliance
either in text or by footnoting the pertinent parts of the initial article, as appropriate.
9.

See generally Christopher R. Drahozal, Is ArbitrationLawless?, 40 LOY. L.A. L. REV.

187 (2006).
10.

Id. at 190. The other two claims undergirding the argument that arbitration is

lawless are that businesses insert arbitration clauses in adhesion contracts to avoid legal
protections for the other party to the contract and that arbitration contributes to a failure of
the courts to create law. Id.

11.

Id. at 203.

12. See id. at 195-97 (relying on a study that reviews citation practices to assess
whether arbitrators follow the law). We focus in this article on whether arbitrators cite
external authority, statutes, cases, administrative regulations, and secondary sources,
which state the law. A later article will address the issue of whether arbitrators cite
arbitration awards, which may or may not be considered law.

13.

In Alexander

v.

Gardner-Denver Co., 415 U.S. 36 (1974), the Supreme Court

determined that a prior arbitration of employees' grievances did not preclude a subsequent
lawsuit for employment discrimination. In Wright v. UniversalMaritime Service Corp., 525
US 70 (1998), the court reached the same conclusion but indicated in 14 Penn Plaza, LLC, v.

Pyett, 556 US 247, 274 (2009), that clear and unmistakable language in the CBA
requiring binding arbitration of statutory clauses is enforceable.

14. 14 Penn Plaza, LLC, v. Pyett, 556 US 247, 274 (2009); Greene v. Am. Bldg. Maint.,
No. 12-CV-4899 DLI LB, 2013 WL 4647520, at *3 (E.D.N.Y. Aug. 28, 2013) (concluding that
CBA waived right to file ADEA claim and citing four other cases finding a CBA to have
similarly waived the right to file an employment suit).
15.

Charles Smith, The Application of Due Process to Arbitration Awards of Punitive

Damages - Where Is the State Action?, 2007 J. DISP. RESOL. 417, 417 (2007); PETER B.
RUTLEDGE, ARBITRATION AND THE CONSTITUTION 145-56 (2013) (discussing due process as

applied to arbitration).
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may not be represented by attorneys;" and arbitrators may be nonlawyers with little understanding or commitment to external legal
protections. 7

Prior empirical research and survey studies about what arbitrators
actually do can serve to unintentionally mute or mask this tension,
however. Specifically, as discussed in Part V.A.5, prior studies indicate
that arbitrators quite commonly cite to external authority, especially
when a statutory right is involved or when one of the parties
introduces external authority in the arbitral proceedings. 8 To provide
one example here, Mark Weidenmaier built on Drahozal's
"lawlessness" work with a study of four different types of arbitration,
including labor arbitration, and concluded that "the evidence provides
little support for the view that arbitrators and judges engage in
qualitatively different kinds of [decision-making] or opinion-writing." 9
Nearly half of his labor awards, all of which were published in BNA
Reports, cited to a judicial opinion or arbitration award."
Such studies suggest that there is little reason to worry about the
structure or outcomes of labor arbitration. When viewed closely,
however, the sources of data previously available to study arbitral
behavior have been limited in ways that may end up painting a rosier
picture of labor arbitration than is warranted. For example, it is well
known in the academic literature that survey responses can be selfserving and less than accurate, 2 ' and that low survey response rates

have the effect of further biasing the results.22 Thus, one might expect
that arbitrators report higher rates of following the law than is
16. STEPHEN J. WARE & ARIANA R. LEVINSON, PRINCIPLES OF ARBITRATION LAW 209
(2017); Erin O'Hara O'Connor & Peter B. Rutledge, Arbitration, the Law Market, and the
Law of Lawyering, 38 INT'L REV. OF L. & ECON. 87, 94 (2014).

17. Kathryn A. Sabbeth & David C. Vladeck, Contracting (Out) Rights, 36 FORDHAM
URB. L.J. 803, 812, 830 (2009); David S. Schwartz, Claim-SuppressingArbitration: The New
Rules, 87 IND. L.J. 239, 252 (2012).
18. See infra Section V.A.5.
19.

W. Mark C. Weidenmaier, Judging-Lite:How Arbitrators Use and Create Precedent,

90 N.C. L. REV. 1091, 1091 (2012).
20. Id. at 1107.
21.

See Philip S. Brenner & John DeLamater, Lies, Damned Lies, and Survey Self-

Reports? Identity as a Cause of Measurement Bias, 79 SOC. PSYCHOL. Q. 333, 333 (2016),
https://doi.org/10.1177/0190272516628298 [https://perma.cc/559X-BZWH]; see also Anton J.
Nederhof, Methods of Coping with Social Desirability Bias: A Review, 15 EUR. J. OF SOC.
PSYCHOL. 263, 263 (1985), https://doi.org/10.1002/ejsp.2420150303 [https://perma.cc/UUT8C28U]; Peter A. Hausdorf, Stephen D. Risavy & David J. Stanley, Interpreting
OrganizationalSurvey Results: A CriticalApplication of the Self-serving Bias, 8 ORG. MGMT.

J. 71 (2011), https://doi.org/10.1057/omj.2011.11 [https://perma.cc/48UN-SP3D].
22.

See Susan M.B. Morton et al., In the 21st Century, What is an Acceptable Response

Rate?, 36 AUSTL. & N.Z. J. OF PUB. HEALTH 106, 106 (2012), https://doi.org/10.1111/j.17536405.2012.00854.x [https://perma.cc/5N5G-L3TV]; ALLYSON L. HOLBROOK ET AL., THE
CAUSES AND CONSEQUENCES OF RESPONSE RATES IN SURVEYS BY THE NEWS MEDIA AND
GOVERNMENT CONTRACTOR SURVEY RESEARCH FIRMS 500 (James M. Lepkowski et al. eds.,

2008),
https://pprg.stanford.edu/wp-content/uploads/2007-TSMII-chapter-proof.pdf
[https://perma.cc/4LBC-PMCP].
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actually the case. Empirical data about actual arbitrations can provide
a more accurate picture, but because arbitration is private, access to
the arbitrations is quite limited. Several empirical studies, including
Weidenmaier's, have used arbitration data available through cases
reported in BNA, 23 but in order for these arbitrations to be reported,
the arbitrator and both parties must agree to the publication.24 These
studies thus share some of the same shortcomings present in survey
data.
To provide more insight into how arbitrators decide labor disputes,
we have amassed a new, more inclusive data set of hundreds of labor
arbitration awards spanning a decade. Under the Federal Arbitration
Act (FAA), parties who wish to confirm, vacate, or modify an arbitral
award must submit a copy of the arbitration award as part of a filing
in federal court, 2 and under the Labor Management Relations Act
(LMRA), parties also often file the award. 26 Those awards are available
as part of the PACER database,"2 so we studied arbitration awards
from federal court cases that were filed between 2001 and 2011. Our
new data set is the first to utilize the PACER data to extract labor
arbitration awards, and it differs from prior data sets in that it
includes both published and unpublished awards and cases. As a
result, our data set enables a broader, and thus potentially more
reliable, study of differing types of labor arbitration. Our data has its
own limitations, which are discussed in Part IV.B. But it nevertheless
provides an enhanced view of labor arbitration that can help
illuminate important policy issues.
In contrast to previous research, we find that the overwhelming
majority of awards do not cite to any external authority (statutes,
administrative authorities, case law) or secondary sources.28 Yet, our
awards provide little evidence that arbitrators explicitly declined to
address a statutory issue raised by one of the parties, indicating that
arbitrators do not seem to affirmatively believe they should not cite to
external authority. As we noted in Levinson et al. (2020), some
protections may increase consideration of law. Arbitrators were more
likely to cite to external authority if one or both parties was
represented by an attorney in the arbitration hearing, which suggests
that legal expertise matters to consideration of the law. In addition,
arbitrators working through an arbitration service provider (AAA or
FMCS) were more likely to cite to external authority than were
arbitrators selected without aid of a service provider.
23.
24.
25.

See infra Part III.
See infra Part III.
Federal Arbitration Act

26.

Historically, parties filed cases to enforce or vacate arbitration awards under the

§13(b),

9 USC §1 et. seq. (2018).

LMRA, but more recently, some parties file under the FAA in addition to the LMRA.
27. See infra note 242.
28. See infra Section V.A.
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We also noted that arbitrators may be more likely to consider the
law in certain types of claims. Arbitrators handling statutory claims
were more likely to cite external authority than were arbitrators
handling other types of claims, but this difference was not as robust as
we anticipated it would be. In fact, no awards involving allegations of
discrimination under the CBA cited to external authority. On the other
hand, awards addressing claims asserting a breach of a just cause
provision (where interpretational aids might be useful) were more
likely than other types of contractual claims to cite to external
authority. These findings indicate there is perhaps much more room
for labor arbitrators to refer to external authority in their
decision-making.
Our results indicate that compliance with governing law (and
therefore perhaps robust employee protections) depends on factors like
attorney representation and service provider guidance. If so, our study
has potential implications for the structure and desirability of
arbitration for labor disputes as well as for other types of arbitration,
including employment, consumer, and securities arbitrations.
Moreover, our more inclusive study indicates that there remains an
inherent tension between peaceful, quick, private dispute resolution
and the risks of potential lawlessness. Those tensions might be greater
for the resolution of statutory claims, and if so, our study has
implications for the desirability and structure of the arbitration of
such claims. For example, examination of external authority and
written reasoning could be required for the binding resolution of statutory claims in labor arbitration.
These policy issues are complex, and it would be foolish to claim
that one empirical study can definitively resolve any of the issues
raised in this article. Nevertheless, our study provides reasons to
question the breadth of prior studies, and it raises questions worthy of
further consideration. In addition, our data suggest more broad
studies are warranted.
Before setting out our empirical findings, this Article briefly
introduces the subject of labor arbitration in Part I. In Part II, we
detail the debate over whether arbitrators should consider external
law and the legal developments that suggest external law is more
likely to be relevant in labor arbitration today. In Part III, we describe
existing empirical studies of labor arbitrator reliance on external
authority and discuss some of the limitations inherent in these
studies. In Part IV, we describe our data, research question, and
methodology. We report our empirical findings in Part V before
concluding.
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FLORIDA STATE UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 48:443

I. A BRIEF INTRODUCTION TO LABOR ARBITRATION

Labor arbitration in the U.S. has a relatively long history,
stemming from efforts to encourage the private resolution of clashes
between workers and managers. 29 Most arbitration in the labor context
results from provisions placed in collective bargaining agreements
(CBAs), 30 which are the agreements negotiated between unions and
their companies regarding workplace conditions and rights, including
benefits, seniority systems, and hiring and promotion procedures. 31
The CBAs are considered to be private governance systems, and often
the union and the company include a provision within the CBA that
mandates that disputes arising under the CBA will be resolved in
arbitration. 32 Arbitration in the labor context was accepted by U.S.
courts long before arbitration of many other types of disputes, 33 and in
general, labor arbitration is insulated from the criticisms and attacks
that beleaguer other types of arbitration. For example, in the last
several Congressional sessions, bills have been introduced (but failed)
to prohibit mandatory arbitration clauses in consumer, employment,
and other types of transactions, 34 yet these bills routinely have
excluded labor arbitration. Both the Arbitration Fairness Act3 5 and the
more recent Restoring Justice for Workers Act 6 explicitly permit
arbitration provisions in collective bargaining agreements between
unions and employers with the caveat that "no such arbitration
provision shall have the effect of waiving the right of an employee to
seek judicial enforcement" of a constitutional or statutory right. These
bills were advanced by advocates who protested the unfairness of
arbitration that results from unequal bargaining power and contracts
of adhesion. 37 The exclusion of labor arbitration from the prohibition
indicates a general assumption that labor arbitration is not plagued
with such problems and that it is a desirable, well-functioning
mechanism to resolve workplace disputes. This Part briefly explains
the history of labor arbitration, the process of the grievance arbitration
system, and the types of written awards that typically result from
labor arbitration.
29.

Dennis R. Nolan & Roger I. Abrams, American Labor Arbitration:The Early Years,

35 FLA. L. REV. 373, 377-79 (1983) (discussing arbitration as a solution to strikes and
violence in the workplace).

30.

WARE, supra note 3, at 197-98.
WARE & LEVINSON, supra note 16, at 181.
32. Id.
33. Nolan & Abrams, supra note 29, at 382-83.
34. See, e.g., Arbitration Fairness Act, S. 2591, 115th Cong. § 2 (2018); Restoring Justice
for Workers Act, H.R. 7109, 115th Cong. § 2 (2018); Forced Arbitration Injustice Repeal Act,
S. 610, 116th Cong. § 2 (2019); Safety Over Arbitration Act, S. 620, 116th Cong. § 402 (2019).
35. Arbitration Fairness Act, S. 2591, 115th Cong. § 402(b)(2) (2018).
36. Restoring Justice for Workers Act, H.R. 7109, 115th Cong. §402(d)(2) (2018).
31.

37. Rep. Nadler Issues Remarks at Markup of Forced Arbitration Injustice Repeal Act,
TARGETED NEWS SERV., Sept. 10, 2019, 2020 LEXISNEXIS 125861151.
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The History of LaborArbitration in the US

In this section, about the history of labor arbitration, and the next,
about the grievance arbitration system, we rely heavily on the
background that we describe in our first article to provide the
necessary context for our current argument regarding the potential

risk of lawlessness in labor arbitration.38
Even before the recent surge in arbitration of statutory employment
law claims, unions and employers were using labor arbitration to
resolve collective bargaining agreement (CBA) disputes. By the 1880s,
labor arbitration "was familiar enough . .. to be recognized in the laws
of a number of states." 39 State law "simply authorized the courts to
appoint local boards of arbitration upon the joint request of employers
and employees." 40 The type of labor arbitration common today, in
which the dispute is resolved by a neutral umpire, "was routine in the
unionized sector of the American economy" by 1940, when the United
Automobile Workers and General Motors "substantially revised their
arbitration procedure." 4 ' Arbitration often served as a substitute for
strikes as a tool to resolve employment disputes, avoiding larger
breakdowns in commerce, and also was an alternative to lawsuits
involving contractual claims. 43
When employees choose union representation, they authorize the
union to bargain with the employer on their behalf regarding the terms
and conditions of employment, and that agreement typically takes the
form of a CBA.4 4 Most CBAs contain a clause that guarantees that
employee discipline, including discharge, can only occur for a just
cause.4 5 This just cause provision replaces employment at will,4 6 the
common law default rule, which states that employees can be
discharged for any reason or no reason at all;4 7 thus, just cause is a
significant contractual protection for union-represented employees.

38. Levinson et al., supra note 7, at 1832-37 (conveying some of the same information
as that herein part " Background").
39.

DENNIS R. NOLAN, LABOR AND EMPLOYMENT ARBITRATION: IN A NUTSHELL 5 (2d ed.

2007).
40. Id.
41. Id. at 6.
42. Id. (noting that Louis Brandeis helped negotiate an agreement to end a garment
industry strike in 1910 and chaired the resultant Board of Arbitration for a decade
thereafter).
43.

DOUGLAS

E.

RAY,

CALVIN

WILLIAM

UNDERSTANDING LABOR LAW 293 (4th ed. 2014).
44. Id. at 159.
45. WARE & LEVINSON, supra note 16, at 218.
46. Id.
47. Id.

SHARPE

&

ROBERT

N.

STRASSFELD,
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Arbitration provisions are also extremely common in CBAs today,48
and some experts state that virtually all CBAs "contain grievance
procedures that utilize arbitration as the last step."4" Section 301(a) of
the Labor Management Relations Act50 confers jurisdiction on federal
courts to enforce CBAs, and the United States Supreme Court has
interpreted section 301(a) to also enable federal courts to enforce CBA
arbitration provisions pursuant to federally-created common law. 5
One rationale for this interpretation was a recognition that the
arbitration provisions are "the quid pro quo for an agreement not to
strike," 5 and therefore, workplace harmony (a key goal of federal labor
policy) requires their vigorous enforcement. If a CBA contains an
arbitration provision, federal courts are instructed to refer disputes
about the CBA to arbitration 53 without any scrutiny of the merits of
the dispute.54
According to the Supreme Court, the CBA is not merely a contract,
but rather it "is an effort to erect a system of industrial selfgovernment."5 5 Often terms in the CBA are vague standards or
references intended to be worked out over time as circumstances arise
and the workplace and business evolve.
Arbitration is the means of solving the unforeseeable by molding a
system of private law for all the problems which may arise and to
provide for their solution in a way which will generally accord with the
variant needs and desires of the parties. The processing of disputes
through the grievance machinery is actually a vehicle by which
meaning and content are given to the CBA. 56
This focus on the larger private employment relationship suggests
a potential tension when disputes arise involving the statutory rights
of individual employees to be free from discrimination or to create
entitlements to particular terms of employment. When bargaining for
48. Id. at 181; Mario F. Bognanno et al., The Conventional Wisdom of Discharge
Arbitration Outcomes and Remedies: Fact or Fiction, 16 CARDOZO J. OF CONFLICT RESOL.
153, 153-54 (2014).
49. KATHERINE V. W. STONE, RICHARD A. BALES & ALEXANDER J. S. COLVIN,
ARBITRATION LAW 723 (3d ed. 2015) (placing frequency of arbitration provisions at "over 99
percent").

50.
51.

29 U.S.C. § 141 (2018); 29 U.S.C.S. § 185 (2018).
Textile Workers Union of Am. v. Lincoln Mills, 353 U.S. 448, 450-51 (1957).

52. Id. at 455 ("[Section 301] expresses a federal policy that federal courts should
enforce these agreements on behalf of or against labor organizations and that industrial
peace can be best obtained only in that way.").

53. United Steelworkers of Am. v. Am. Manuf. Co., 363 U.S. 564, 566 (1960)
(interpreting section 203(d) of the LMRA which states that "[f]inal adjustment by a method
agreed upon by the parties is hereby declared to be the desirable method for settlement of
grievance disputes arising over the application of interpretation of an existing [CBA]").

54. Id. at 567.
55. United Steelworkers of Am. v. Warrior & Gulf Navigation Co., 363 U.S. 574, 580
(1960).
56. Id. at 581.
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and representing the collective, unions inevitably must trade off the
vigorous representation of particular employee interests for the
welfare of the group.5 7 Yet, statutory employment rights are designed
to extend to each individual employee without regard to union or other
employee interests. Moreover, statutory rights are public rather than
private law, 58 and they thus conflict with the notion that the workplace
should be left entirely to self-government. For these reasons, in
Alexander v. Gardner-DenverCo., 59 the Supreme Court concluded that
employees have an independent right to take their civil rights claims
to court, notwithstanding a CBA's arbitration clause, even when the
employee's claim was previously denied in arbitration. 60 The Court
reasoned that "[Title VII] concerns not majoritarian processes, but an
individual's right to equal employment opportunities. Title VII's
strictures are absolute and represent a congressional command that
each employee be free from discriminatory practices."6
In the ensuing decades, however, the Supreme Court determined
that the Federal Arbitration Act mandates enforcement of arbitration
clauses in individual employment agreements, 62 and that when
arbitration agreements cover disputes involving statutory claims,
their judicial resolution can be foreclosed. 63 Initially, the Court
distinguished CBA arbitration by noting that in labor arbitration, the
arbitrator's jurisdiction is confined by the CBA and that the union
might not fully represent individual employee rights in all
circumstances. 64 In 1998, however, the Court decided Wright v.
Universal Maritime Service Corp., in which it signaled without
deciding that it might be possible for a CBA to declare that statutory
rights' claims of union members must be resolved in labor arbitration
rather than in the courts. 65 Whether Wright actually opened the door
to court foreclosure of statutory claims and what would be needed to
bargain for such disclosure was the subject of disagreement in the
federal courts, so in 2009, the Court granted certiorari in order to settle

57.

See generally RAY, SHARPE & STRASSFELD, supra note 43; United Steelworkers of

Am., 363 U.S. at 582.
58. Shyamkrishna Balganesh, Private Law Statutory Interpretation, 92 S. CALIF. L.
REV. 949, 969-70 (2019).

59.

415 U.S. 36, 48-60 (1974).

60. Id. at 59-60 (holding that when an arbitrator has decided against the union on a
contractual discrimination claim that decision does not preclude the employee from

bringing a statutory discrimination claim. The judge in the litigation can provide the
arbitrator's decision the weight the judge deems appropriate, including no weight at all).

61.
62.
63.
64.
65.

Id. at 51.
Gilmer v. Interstate/Johnson Lane Corp., 500 U.S. 20, 29 (1991).
Id. at 35.
Id. at 34.
Wright v. Universal Mar. Ser. Corp., 525 U.S. 70, 80-82 (1998).
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the question.66 In 14 Penn Plaza LLC v. Pyett, the Court dismissed
concerns about the proper resolution of statutory claims in labor
arbitration and held that a CBA "that clearly and unmistakably
requires union members to arbitrate ADEA claims is enforceable."67
Thus, prior to 1998, statutory employee claims were reserved for
courts, between 1998 and 2009, federal courts were split on this issue,
and after 2009, statutory claims could be definitively resolved in labor
arbitration if the CBA clearly stated that the claims were to be so
resolved. This development is important for the study period of our
data, which spans from 2000 to 2011.
B.

GrievanceArbitration System

CBAs often include not just a requirement to arbitrate disputes but
also describe a process for handling grievances that is designed to
resolve workplace disputes efficiently with as little formality as
possible through negotiation, or ultimately arbitration, which is
intended to be more efficient and less time-consuming than litigation. 68
Many involve a stepped procedure. 69 An example from one CBA is set
out in Appendix A. The process begins at step one, where the employee
discusses her grievance with her manager. If they are unable to resolve
the grievance, it moves to step two, wherein the union puts the
grievance in writing, and a union representative meets with a higherlevel manager to attempt to resolve the dispute. Failing resolution at
step two, the union representative invokes step three and meets with
the general manager. At step four, the union requests arbitration.
CBAs contemplate binding arbitration, which means that the
arbitrator's decision is final, judicially enforceable, and subject to
appeal on only very narrow grounds that do not include legal or factual
errors made by the arbitrator. 0
Each CBA provides its own procedure for choosing an arbitrator or
panel of arbitrators. Some CBAs provide for use of a third-party
arbitration service provider, such as the American Arbitration
Association (AAA) or the Federal Mediation and Conciliation Service
(FMCS)." Arbitration service providers vet and provide training to

66.

14 Penn Plaza LLC v. Pyett, 556 U.S. 247, 255 & n.4 (2009) ("We granted certiorari

to address the issue left unresolved in Wright, which continues to divide the Courts of
Appeals, and now reverse."(internal citation omitted) (noting a circuit split on the issue)).

67. Id. at 274.
68. See Stephen J. Ware, The Case for Enforcing Adhesive Arbitration Agreementswith ParticularConsiderationof Class Actions and ArbitrationFees, 5 J. OF AM. ARB. 251,
254-56 (2006) (noting benefits of time and other cost savings when parties opt for
arbitration rather than litigation in consumer and employment contexts).

69.
70.

WARE & LEVINSON, supra note 16, at 206.
United Paperworkers Int'l Union v. Misco, Inc., 484 U.S. 29, 38 (1987) ("Courts thus

do not sit to hear claims of factual or legal error by an arbitrator .... ").
71.

WARE & LEVINSON, supra note 16, at 207.
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panels of arbitrators that are made available to the parties,72 and they
also provide rules of procedure that parties and arbitrators can utilize
as a matter of default to govern their proceedings. 73 Depending on the
terms of the CBA or the parties' preferences, the service provider can
provide a list of affiliated arbitrators from which the parties can select
an arbitrator or a panel of three arbitrators.74 Varying procedures for
selecting the arbitrators from this list can be followed. The service
provider might give the parties a finite list of names75 and the parties
indicate their preferences, which the service accounts for in assigning
an arbitrator. 76 Some CBAs may provide that the parties obtain a list
from a service provider and then take turns striking arbitrators from
the list until one arbitrator remains. 77 CBAs can specify the names of
several arbitrators, and the parties may rotate through them7 8 or pick
by striking arbitrator names for each dispute. CBAs might also specify
one-named arbitrator for all disputes, and some may simply provide
for the parties to pick an arbitrator on a case-by-case basis. 79
Some CBAs contain a unique form of "arbitration,"8 0 which enlists
a joint arbitration board within the workplace instead of using a
neutral third party. The joint arbitration board is usually composed of
an equal number of employer or industry representatives and union
representatives, and board members typically are not attorneys.8 ' If
the joint arbitration board resolves the dispute, its decision is binding
in the same way an arbitration award would be binding.8 2 The CBA

72.

AM.

The AAA National Roster of Arbitrators and Mediators:EXPERTISE MATTERS,

ARBITRATION

ASS'N:

ARBITRATORS

&

MEDIATORS,

https://www.adr.org/aaa-panel

[https://perma.cc/AFR8-63KQ] (last visited April 1, 2021); 29 C.F.R. § 1404.5 (2019); Homer
C. La Rue & Alan A. Symonette, The Ray Corollary Initiative: How to Achieve
Diversity and Inclusion in ArbitratorSelection, 63 HOw. L.J. 215, 226 (2020).
73.

See, e.g., Erin O'Hara O'Connor, Kenneth J. Martin & Randall S. Thomas,

Customizing Employment Arbitration, 98 IOwA L. REV. 133, 162-65 (2012) (providing
empirical evidence of choices of arbitration associations and their default rules).

74.
75.
76.
77.
78.
79.

WARE & LEVINSON, supra note 16, at 207-08.

Id. at
Id. at
Id.
Id. at
Id. at

207.
208.
207.
208.

80. "Arbitration" is described in quotes because not all courts would determine that
such review panels constitute arbitration within the meaning of state law. See

Cheng-Canindin v. Renaissance Hotel Assocs., 57 Cal. Rptr. 2d 867, 871-72 (Cal. Ct. App.
1996). For the purposes of our study, we treat these dispute resolution processes as
equivalent to arbitration when the CBA intends for them to be final and binding.
81. WARE & LEVINSON, supra note 16, at 208; Ariana R. Levinson, What the Awards
Tell Us about Labor Arbitration of Employment Discrimination Claims, 46 U. MICH. J.L.
REFORM 789, 830 (2013) [hereinafter Levinson, What the Awards Tell Us].
82.

Levinson et al., supra note 7, at 1835.
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might provide that the decision of the joint arbitration board is the
final step of arbitration. 83
Arbitrators, even those who are selected by a service provider or are
specified as a named arbitrator or panel of arbitrators in a CBA, do not
necessarily have Juris Doctor degrees (J.D.s).8 4 Some arbitrators have
Doctor of Philosophy degrees (Ph.D.s) in labor relations or similar
fields; others have relevant expertise gained by working in a particular
unionized industry.85 Indeed, one of the advantages of labor arbitration
is its ability to have someone familiar with the industry and the nuances of labor relations to help give meaning to the parties' agreement.8 6
Because arbitration is intended to be efficient and inexpensive, arbitration proceedings tend to be informal.87 Discovery is limited, 88 and
the rules of evidence are only loosely followed. 89 Arbitrators sometimes
are more inquisitorial than U.S. judges, 90 and they are less likely to
conclude that one party is correct or prevails when both have
contributed to the fractious situation. 91 Moreover, arbitrators often are
83. See, e.g., Ford, Harrison LLP, Painting Contractor Gets Primer on Labor
Arbitration: 21 No. 2111. Emp. L. Letter 6, LABOR RELATIONS 1 (2010).

84.

Michel Picher, Ronald L. Seeber & David B. Lipsky, The ArbitrationProfession in

Transition: A Survey of the National Academy of Arbitrators, 3 CORNELL/PERC INST. ON
1,
12
(2000),
http://naarb.org/proceedings/synopses.asp
CONFLICT
RESOL.

[https://perma.cc/X3S5-MDGU] (noting that 61.4% of NAA arbitrators in 1999 had a law or
J.D. degree).
85. See id. at 12, 21-22.
86. See United Steelworkers of Am. V. Warrior & Gulf Navigation Co., 363 U.S. 574,
582 (1960), ("The labor arbitrator is usually chosen because of the parties' confidence in his
knowledge of the common law of the shop and their trust in his personal judgment to bring
to bear considerations which are not expressed in the contract as criteria for judgment. The
parties expect that his judgment of a particular grievance will reflect . . . such factors as the
effect upon the productivity of a particular result, its consequence[s] to the morale of the

shop, his judgment whether tensions will be heightened or diminished.... The ablest judge
cannot be expected to bring the same experience and competence to bear upon the
determination of a grievance, because he cannot be similarly informed.").
87.

Erin O'Hara O'Connor, ProtectingConsumer DataPrivacy with Arbitration, 96 N.C.

L. REV. 711, 728-29 (2018).
88. 3 IAN R. MACNEIL, RICHARD E. SPEIDEL & THOMAS J. STIPANOWICH, FEDERAL
ARBITRATION LAW: AGREEMENTS, AWARDS, AND REMEDIES UNDER THE FEDERAL ARBITRA-

TION ACT

§

34.1 (1994 & Supp. 1999) ("Limitations on discovery ...

remain one of the

hallmarks of American commercial arbitration . . . . Avoidance of the delay and expense
associated with discovery is still one of the reasons parties choose to arbitrate." (citing
William L.D. Barrett, Arbitration of a Complex Commercial Case: PracticalGuidelines for

Arbitrators and Counsel, 41 ARB. J. 15, 19 (1986))); Christopher R. Drahozal, Why Arbitrate?
Substantive versus ProceduralTheories of Private Judging, 22 AM. REV. INT'L ARB. 163, 173

(2011).
89.

WARE & LEVINSON, supra note 16, at 211.

90.

Wayne D. Brazil, When "Getting it Right" Is What Matters Most, ArbitrationsAre

Better than Trials, 18 CARDOZO J. OF CONFLICT RESOL. 277, 282-83 (2017) (arbitrator
discussing his use of questioning and active engagement in arbitration).

91.

See Alan Scott Rau, Integrity in Private Judging, 38

S. TEX.

L. REV. 485, 501-02

(1997). Rau attributes this tendency toward compromise solutions to a desire to garner
repeat business from the parties. Id. at 523.
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empowered to be more creative than judges in fashioning remedies for
the parties. 92

C.

Level of Formality of Labor Awards

Labor awards-like judicial opinions-are written with varying
levels of formality. Some arbitrators may avoid accompanying their
awards with written rationales that resemble judicial opinions on the
theory that the failure to include written rationales helps to insulate
the arbitration award from court scrutiny. 93 The idea is that courts
must locate particular types of problems in order to set aside
arbitration awards and those problems are almost impossible to
identify without a written rationale. 94 On the other hand, many
arbitrators who have received formal training through arbitration
service providers, such as the AAA, or are required to stay current in
their field, such as by the NAA (National Academy of Arbitrators),
author written opinions supporting their award in each case. 95
92.

Bowen v. Amoco Pipeline Co., 254 F.3d 925, 936 (10th Cir. 2001) ("Arbitrators are

chosen for their specialized experience and knowledge, which enable them to fashion creative
remedies and solutions that courts may be less likely to endorse.").
93. Our data set reflects that of 281 awards where a service provider was not used and
the award was decided by a traditional arbitrator or panel of arbitrators, only eight
(approximately 3%) contained the award with no opinion or explanation, whereas of the
awards where no service provider was used and the award was decided by a joint board or
similar group of industry experts, 52 of 121 (approximately 43%) contained only the award.
The judiciary increasingly has effectively required arbitrators to issue written opinions
explaining their awards in order for their decisions to survive judicial review. See generally
2 EMP. DISCRIMINATION L. & LITIG. § 13:63 (2020) (discussing split of opinion on whether to
include written decisions with awards in labor employment arbitration).

94. Stephen J. Ware, Default Rules from Mandatory Rules: PrivatizingLaw through
Arbitration, 83 MINN. L. REV. 703, 722-23 (1999).
95.

Cf. W. Mark C. Weidenmaier, Toward a Theory of Precedent in Arbitration,51 WM.

& MARY L. REV. 1895, 1919. (2010); Cynthia Alkon, Women Labor Arbitrators: Women
Members of the National Academy of ArbitratorsSpeak about the Barriersof Entry into the

Field, 6 APPALACHIAN J.L. 195, 195-96 (2007) (describing requirements for entry into AAA
requires training in dispute resolution, and NAA requires demonstrated experience); see also
NATIONAL ACADEMY OF ARBITRATORS, CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY FOR ARBITRATORS OF LABOR-MANAGEMENT DISPUTES 7 (Sept. 2007), https://naarb.org/wp-content/up-

loads/2017/03/NAACODE07.pdf [https://perma.cc/94SS-GPZG] ("To this end, an arbitrator
should keep current with principles, practices and developments that are relevant to the
arbitrator's field of practice."); see Abraham J. Gafni, Written Opinions in ArbitrationAren't
a Given, LAW.COM (Sept. 22, 2008), https://www.law.com/almID/1202424702244/

[https://perma.cc/Q9GH-RR7Z]

("AAA Labor Arbitration Rules provide the opposite pre-

sumption, i.e., that such a reasoned opinion will be issued by the arbitrator unless the parties
agree that one should not be prepared."); Michael Z. Green, Reconsidering Prejudice in

Alternative Dispute Resolution for Black Work Matters, 70 SMU L. Rev. 639, 659 (2017) ("To
be an NAA member, [in 2017] an arbitrator must have 'a minimum of 60 written decisions
in a time period not to exceed six years."') (citing Membership Guidelines, NAT'L ACADEMY
OF ARBITRATORS https://naarb.org/membership-guidelines/ [https://perma.cc/S2UD-VXQ7]
(last visited Sept. 19, 2017)); Membership Guidelines, NAT'L ACADEMY OF ARBITRATORS

https://naarb.org/membership-guidelines/ [https://perma.cc/S2UD-VXQ7] (last visited Sept.
19, 2017) (In 2020, NAA required 60 written opinions in a six-year period).
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Arbitrators who choose to write reasoned awards typically do so in
order to show the parties that they have considered all of the
arguments as well as the evidence presented. 96 Doing so helps the
parties to accept the arbitrator's determination. 97 One of the aims of
our empirical study is to learn more about the form, detail, and
argumentation found in these typically private documents.
II. THE INEVITABLE TENSION BETWEEN PRIVATE CREATION OF
WORKPLACE HARMONY AND VINDICATION OF PUBLIC LAW
EMPLOYMENT PROTECTIONS

As originally conceived by the courts and scholars, labor arbitration
is intended to prevent strikes and to enable the resolution of workplace
disputes according to the private governance system contained in
CBAs. 98 According to federal policy, in general, the arbitrator's award
does not need to comply with governing law or legal principles. 99 It
need only find its basis in the CBA and not violate clearly defined
and important public policy principles. 0 0 From this perspective,
arbitrators typically need not ground their reasoning or results in
external legal authority.' 0 ' Indeed, non-lawyers might well not be
trained to research, identify, or apply governing law, and nothing
about labor arbitration requires the participation of lawyers as
advocates or arbitrators.1 02 One might thus conclude from the
structure and rationale of labor arbitration that arbitrators should not
consider or cite to external legal authority when resolving disputes.1 03
The CBA should be the only external document considered by the
arbitrator.
However, legal rules and principles are fashioned to guide
employers and to protect employees, and thus, they might be helpful
or even normatively required guides for arbitrators. Consider, for
example, Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, the Americans with
Disabilities Act (ADA), the Age Discrimination in Employment Act
96. Weidenmaier, supra note 95, at 1918 ("One benefit of reasoned awards is that losing
parties may be more inclined to view them as legitimate and thus to comply voluntarily. To
that end, a 'careful demonstration that the decisionmaker has listened and responded to' the
losing party's arguments may enhance the prospects of voluntary compliance.").
97.

Calvin

William

Sharpe,

Integrity Review

of Statutory Arbitration Awards,

54 HASTINGS L.J. 311, 356-57 (2002) (noting labor arbitrators traditionally write opinions).
98. See Stone, Bales & Colvin, supra note 49, at ch. 5 (presenting and analyzing
relevant case law and theoretical analyses of this basis for labor arbitration).
99. But see WARE & LEVINSON, supra note 16, at 193 (explaining some courts may apply
a manifest disregard of the law standard to reviewing labor arbitration awards).

100.

United Steelworkers of Am. v. Enter. Wheel & Car Corp., 363 U.S. 593, 596-97

(1960); WARE & LEVINSON, supra note 16, at 190 (explaining three primary grounds for
vacatur as procedural unfairness, clearly exceeding authority granted by CBA, and violation

of fundamental and well-defined public policy).
101.

Meltzer, supra note 1, at 557.

102.
103.

Id. at 558.
Id. at 557.
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(ADEA), the Family and Medical Leave Act (FMLA), and other
employee protections, all of which are intended as universal
protections for employees.'04 Even contract default rules, often
considered private law, are designed to nudge parties toward
particular norms of interaction and treatment which are implicated in
arbitration. 0 5 Not surprisingly then, labor arbitrators and scholars
have long debated whether arbitrators should consider statutes,
particularly to ensure that their interpretation of a CBA does not
violate the law.1 06 Further, arbitrators and scholars have debated
whether they should consider external authority to give meaning to
the CBA1 07 or to apply CBA provisions with clear legal counterparts,
such as antidiscrimination provisions.1 08 When should they consider
other sources of law, such as administrative regulations, or court
decisions interpreting a statute1 09 or common law? Finally, secondary
sources might help to clarify a complex area of the law.
A.

The Early Normative Debate over Reliance on Legal Authority

The debate over citation to legal authority is essentially one about
the hierarchy between the private governance systems contained in
the CBA and the governance principles articulated by the state and
contained in external legal authorities. Early on the debaters asked
whether it would be permissible for a labor arbitrator to ignore
governing law and consequently interpret a CBA in such a way that it
requires or permits unlawful action. The most well-known articulation
of this debate took place between Bernard Meltzer and Robert Howlett
at the National Academy of Arbitrators (NAA) annual meeting in 1967.
Meltzer argued that arbitrators should interpret the contract without
regard to external law, even in cases where there is "an irrepressible
104. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2 (2018); Americans with Disabilities Act, 42 U.S.C. § 12101
(2018); Age Discrimination in Employment Act of 1967, 29 U.S.C. § 621 (2018); Family and
Medical Leave Act of 1993, 29 U.S.C. § 2601 (2018).
105.

On the use of default rules to nudge people toward superior outcomes, see generally

Cass R. Sunstein, Deciding by Default, 162 U. PA. L. Rev. 1 (2013).
106. Martin H. Malin, Revisiting the Meltzer-Howlett Debate on External Law in Labor
Arbitration:Is It Time for Courts to Declare Howlett the Winner?, 24 LAB. L. 1, 2 (2008).
107. Cf. Meltzer, supra note 1, at 557 (noting arbitrators should consider regulation as
one factor when interpreting a loosely formulated standard like "just cause," or adopt a
contractual interpretation consistent with the law when a provision is "susceptible to two
interpretations."); Theodore J. St. Antoine, External Law in Arbitration:Hard-Boiled, SoftBoiled, and Sunny-Side Up, in ARBITRATION 2004: NEW ISSUES AND INNOVATIONS IN
WORKPLACE DISPUTE RESOLUTION, PROCEEDINGS OF THE 57TH ANNUAL MEETING, NATIONAL
ACADEMY OF ARBITRATORS 185, 188 (Charles J. Coleman ed., 2004), https://naarb.org//pro-

ceedings/pdfs/2004-185.pdf

[https://perma.c/D52M-VYM9]

[hereinafter

St.

Antoine,

External Law in Arbitration] ("Everyone seems to agree, including the Supreme Court, that
an arbitrator may look to the law for guidance in interpreting a contractual provision.").
108.

Levinson, What the Awards Tell Us, supra note 81, at 830.

109. Even in a case involving a statutory issue, determining whether ordering a certain
employer action would require an employer to violate the law might not be ascertainable
from the face of the applicable statute.
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conflict" between the CBA's requirements and those of external law."o
In other words, "respect the agreement and ignore the law.""' For an
arbitrator to do otherwise would require exceeding the granted
contractual authority to interpret the contract" 2 and require those
who are not experts in the law, including those without any legal
training, to interpret the law.113 Meltzer opined that if arbitrators
considered the law in cases where the contract's requirements
appeared to be contrary to the law, "they would be impinging on an
area in which courts or other official tribunals are granted plenary
authority," making "limited judicial review" inappropriate."4
Howlett argued, in contrast, that arbitrators should consider
external law and should avoid making awards that required unlawful
action." 5 He proposed that "arbitratorsshould render decisions on the
issues before them based on both contract language and law."116
Indeed, some of the rules regarding the unionized workplace stem from
legal principles. For example, the NLRA prohibits employers and
unions from committing unfair labor practices. The relevant provisions
prohibit employers from discriminating against employees for
engaging in union activity or collective action to improve working
conditions and require employers making changes to working
conditions to bargain in good faith with the union first."' CBAs
frequently include protections parallel to these, such as clauses
prohibiting anti-union discrimination." 8 CBAs can also take the
opposite approach and purport to eliminate NLRA protections, such as
by allowing an employer to circumvent the requirement of bargaining
with the union before changing certain working conditions.11 9 It is
certainly possible for the same factual scenario to give rise to both an
unfair labor practice charge and a grievance under the CBA."2 o

110.

Meltzer, supra note 1, at 557.

111.

Id.

112.

Id.

113.

Id. at 558.
Id. at 558-59.

114.

115. Robert G. Howlett, The Arbitrator, the NLRB and the Courts, in THE ARBITRATOR,
THE NLRB, AND THE COURTS: PROCEEDINGS OF THE 20TH ANNUAL MEETING, NATIONAL
ACADEMY OF ARBITRATORS 67, 104-06 (Dallas L. Jones ed., 1967), https://naarb.org//proceed-

ings/pdfs/1967-67.pdf [https://perma.cc/NS5S-2CZ3] [hereinafter Howlett, The Arbitrator];
see also Robert G. Howlett, A Reprise, in DEVELOPMENTS IN AMERICAN AND FOREIGN
ARBITRATION: PROCEEDINGS OF THE 21ST ANNUAL MEETING, NATIONAL ACADEMY OF
ARBITRATORS 64, 68-69 (Charles M. Rehmus ed., 1968), https://naarb.org//proceed-

ings/pdfs/1968-64.pdf [https://perma.cc/T53E-W9NQ] [hereinafter Howlett, A Reprise].
116. Howlett, The Arbitrator, supra note 115, at 83 (italics omitted).
117.

Levinson et al., supra note 7, at 1839.

118.

Id.

119.

Id.

120.

Id.
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Howlett opined that arbitrators should actively look for statutory
NLRA issues that need resolution.12 He argued that while the roles of
the arbitrator and the National Labor Relations Board (NLRB) are
"mutually exclusive" "in theory," in reality "'disputes are often difficult
to classify' and in some controversies a 'blurred line . . . often exists."1"2 2
In Howlett's view, arbitrators are bound by the law, and CBAs, like all
contracts, include "all applicable law."1 23 Because contracts are
circumscribed by external law, "[a]n award that does not consider the
law may result in error."1 2 4 Howlett rebutted the notion that because
some arbitrators are not attorneys they should not be addressing legal
issues by pointing out that NLRB agents who must interpret and apply
the law are not all attorneys either.12 5
As to non-NLRA legal issues, Howlett argued that arbitrators have
the time and energy to research the law and "that arbitrators, having
some expertise in the area of labor law, are more knowledgeable in the
area in which they work than are circuit judges."1 26 He noted that while
labor arbitration is viewed as a substitute for a strike, it is also "a
substitute for the courts."12 Responding to the argument that if
arbitrators begin ruling on non-contractual legal issues, the courts will
expand their review of arbitration decisions beyond the traditional
limited grounds for review-lack of jurisdiction, fraud, or corruptionHowlett advocated for more extensive review given that arbitrators,
like judges, do make mistakes.12
Richard Mittenthal then contributed to the debate by offering a
"middle ground" position1 29-that an award may "permit conduct
forbidden by law but . . . not require conduct forbidden by law."1 30 He
asserted that in situations where the parties incorporate statutory
provisions "as a portion of their contract," an arbitrator "properly

refer[s] to the relevant legislation."13' Further, when the language in a
CBA is general, an arbitrator properly considers "all relevant
121.

Howlett, The Arbitrator, supra note 115, at 92; Levinson et al., supra note 7, at

1839-40.
122.

Howlett, The Arbitrator, supra note 115, at 70 (quoting Carey v. Westinghouse

Electric Corp., 375 U.S. 261, 268, 269 (1964)) (internal marks omitted); Levinson et al., supra
note 7, at 1840.
123.

1840.
124.
125.
126.
127.

Howlett, The Arbitrator, supra note 115, at 83; Levinson et al., supra note 7, at

Howlett, The Arbitrator, supra note 115, at 83.
Howlett, A Reprise, supra note 115, at 105.
Id. at 68.
Id. at 69 (quoting Clyde W. Summers, Labor Arbitration:A PrivateProcess with a

PublicFunction, 34 REV. JUR. U.P.R. 477, 494 (1965)).
128. Id. at 73-75.
129. Richard Mittenthal, The Role of Law in Arbitration, in DEVELOPMENTS IN
AMERICAN AND FOREIGN ARBITRATION: PROCEEDINGS OF THE 21ST ANNUAL MEETING,
NATIONAL ACADEMY OF ARBITRATORS 42, 42 (Charles M. Rehmus ed., 1968).

130.
131.

Mittenthal, supra note 129, at 50; Levinson et al., supra note 7, at 1840.
Mittenthal, supra note 129, at 42-43; Levinson et al., supra note 7, at 1840.
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circumstances, including any relevant statute."1 32 When a CBA uses a
term that is vague, then an arbitrator "should choose that
interpretation which will harmonize the contract with the law."13 3
However, Mittenthal disputed Howlett's claim that the law is
implied in every CBA.1 34 First, Mittenthal argued that that premise is
based on a fiction because judges determine the meaning of a contract
on their own before then fashioning the remedy to comply with law.1 35
Second, he argued, arbitrators' authority stems from the parties'
contract rather than from public law, unlike judges' authority, and so
arbitrators should adhere to the intent of the parties over the
requirements of the law.1 36 Particularly where there is no mention of
the specific law that may abrogate the CBA provision at issue in the
arbitration, such as a law that requires seniority for veterans during
a layoff, and where the contract instead requires seniority in a layoff
based on actual time worked, the arbitrator should be able to resolve
the contractual issue without consideration of the law.1 37 In this
circumstance, under Mittenthal's approach, the arbitrator would deny
the veteran's grievance because the employer had followed the CBA
and would leave it to the veteran to pursue his remedy in federal
court. 38
After refuting Howlett's claim, Mittenthal countered Meltzer's
claim that an arbitrator should follow the contract completely and
ignore the law.1 39 He pointed out that when law is an issue, parties can
simply pick arbitrators with legal expertise, quashing Meltzer's
concern about arbitrators lacking legal expertise. 4 0 Furthermore,
parties typically "do not wish to be bound by an invalid provision" and
often include a separability or saving clause'14 in their CBA. 4 2 Parties
also generally agree that the arbitrator's award is final and binding,
which suggests that they do not want an arbitrator to ignore the law
and "invite[] noncompliance" with the award (on the part of an
employer who is reluctant to violate the law).1 43 For example, in the
scenario described above, if the company had retained the veteran and
the non-veteran with more seniority had raised a grievance, it would
132.
133.
134.
135.
136.
137.
138.
139.
140.

Mittenthal, supra note 129, at 43; Levinson et al.,
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be problematic for the arbitrator to sustain the grievance and require
the employer to violate the law by retaining a non-veteran over a
veteran.
B. Ignoring External Authority is Problematic Today
Many commentators have entered this debate and enriched the
arguments on both sides," but they note that the early position that
arbitrators should ignore external authority was an easier one to
sustain prior to a time when arbitrator jurisdiction extended beyond
interpretation of the CBA and started to at least potentially include
binding resolution of statutory claims. The proliferation of state
and federal statutory employment rights, such as those applying to
veterans, employees with family medical issues, 4 5 and to gay and
transgender employees, has increased the degree of overlap between
the CBA and statutory law.1 46 Presumably, legislatures intend for
these protections to apply to all employees, so labor arbitrators should
be aware of and apply the relevant legal sources and principles. That
norm can apply to any legal rule or principle designed to protect
employees.
Perhaps most problematic is the lack of robust structural protection
for unionized employees seeking to protect their statutory rights. As
noted in Part I, today, employees can be forced to take their statutory
claims to arbitration rather than courts. 4 7 This change in legal
principle increases the jurisdiction of the arbitrator beyond the
confines of the rights and responsibilities granted in the CBA, and,
144.
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arguably, this increased jurisdiction should be confined by legal
principle. As noted earlier, movements to protect employees from
mandatory arbitration agreements typically exempt labor arbitration
under CBAs but do not exempt mandatory labor arbitration
of statutory rights. 4 8 In general, the rationale for exempting
labor arbitration is the added layer of protection that unions, as
repeat-player employee advocates, provide to employees in
arbitration.1 49 Additionally, the protections provided by unionization
and collective bargaining are generally more protective than the
minimums established by law, such as employment at will and a wage
of $7.25 an hour, meaning that without arbitration, courts likely would
be clogged with workplace disputes of a type they do not normally
handle.1 50 Moreover, labor arbitration is essential for preventing
strikes and other workplace unrest.151 Unfortunately, these rationales
do not necessarily apply in the context of statutory protections. These
protections can be costly to employers, 5 2 and unions might be willing
to functionally trade away these often minority employee protections
in favor of better terms for the majority.153 In the end, perhaps no one
in the CBA bargaining process or the grievance arbitration cares to
protect the interests of the minority employee. Arbitrators poorly
trained in or willfully ignoring these legal protections end up
unwittingly making this trade possible.15 4
148.

See supra Part I.

149.
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Perhaps not surprisingly, then, almost all of those weighing in to
the debate today acknowledge the desirability of considering external
law in at least some labor arbitration contexts. This evolution results
from the inevitable tension present in today's labor arbitration. On the
one hand, it is as important as ever to promote workplace harmony
and the private evolution of most workplace governance structures. On
the other hand, too much cultivation of the private governance
structures creates a risk of lawlessness in workplace dispute
resolution. Such lawlessness can, in particular cases, redound to the
detriment of either employer or employee. To the extent that in some
cases employers are better represented at the bargaining table than
employees, the imbalance disfavors the employees.
III. WHAT DO LABOR ARBITRATORS ACTUALLY CONSIDER?

It is clear that there has been extensive debate over whether
arbitrators should consider external authority, but much less has been
written about whether labor arbitrators actually do consider external
authority. Section A briefly describes previous studies of the
question.15 5 Unfortunately, much of what has been written on the
latter inquiry predates the changes in arbitrator jurisdiction to cover
statutory claims, and some studies rely on unreliable survey data or
arbitration cases conducted or reported in ways that bias results.
Section B discusses these weaknesses.
A.

Previous Studies

56

Harry T. Edwards's1 1975 study "attempted to determine . . . the
extent to which arbitrators are competent to handle 'legal' issues in
employment discrimination cases." 5 7 He surveyed members of the
NAA with a response rate of just below 50%.158 "[Seventy-seven]
percent of the respondents had read judicial opinions involving claims
of discrimination under Title VII ... 16[%] ... had never read any such
judicial opinions, and 7[%] . . . declined to answer."1 59 Just over half of
respondents (52%) said that they read "labor advance sheets [a
particular type of secondary source] to keep abreast of current
developments under Title VII," while 40% indicated they did not.1 60
The remainder (8%) declined to answer.161

155. Section A relies on our prior summary of these studies in Part II, Section E of our
initial article regarding this data set. Levinson et al., supra note 7, at 1844-51.
156.

Edwards, supra note 2, at 59.
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Id. at 71.

158. Of the 409 arbitrators
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The study also determined that "[n]early two-thirds of the
responding arbitrators ... believed that an arbitrator has no business
interpreting or applying a public statute in a contractual grievance
dispute."1 62 Yet nearly all of the two-thirds who so believed "conceded
that there were certain exceptions to this rule." 6 3 Eighty-five percent
agreed that it is appropriate for an arbitrator to consider public law
"to avoid compelling [a party] to do something that is clearly
unlawful."1 64 Ninety-five percent conceded that arbitrators may refer
to governing law where "the parties have intentionally adopted a
contract clause ... with the object of incorporating the body of public
law into the contract."1 65 "[Ninety-seven] percent . . . agreed that an
arbitrator should consider public law when the parties have, by
submission, conferred jurisdiction" on the arbitrator "to decide the
contract issue in light of the applicable federal or state law."1 66 Onethird of the overall respondents held the belief that "a collective
bargaining agreement must be read to include by reference all public
law applicable thereto."1 67
In a 1979 paper, Margaret Oppenheimer and Helen LaVan
considered labor arbitration awards made in disputes involving
employment discrimination.168 The data set consisted of "[a]ll
discrimination cases from March 1973 through November 1975
reported in [the BNA's] Labor Arbitration Reports," a total of eightysix cases.169 The awards "cited federal or state law or EEOC guidelines
in 60[%] of the cases, and referred to judicial decisions in 40[%] of the
cases. Other arbitration decisions were cited in 35[%] of the cases."170
Of these three categories of citation to external authority, "[17%] of all
decisions cited all three, while another 28[%] cited two of the three."' 7
The analysis found that citation to federal or state law or EEOC
guidelines was higher in cases where the grievant prevailed,
discrimination was found, or back pay was awarded. 7 2 There was no
significant relationship between these kinds of cases and citation to
judicial decisions or other arbitration awards, except for a slight
correlation between such citation and an award of back pay.1 73
162.
163.
164.
165.
166.
167.
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Id.
Id.
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"Whether the arbitrator was a lawyer had no effect on any decision
variables, nor was it significantly related to whether the arbitrator
cited law, judicial decisions, arbitration, or past practice." 7 4 The
article concluded that "the feeling that arbitrators who are attorneys
are more qualified to hear discrimination cases may be unfounded,
unless one assumes that attorneys cite law more accurately.
Qualifications
such as familiarity with the industry and
discrimination law, in particular, may be more relevant." 7 5
Benjamin Wolkinson and Dennis Liberson reviewed labor
arbitration cases that involved certain types of sex discrimination
disputes from the Bureau of National Affairs (BNA) Labor Arbitration
Reports between 1975-1980.176 They found that many arbitrators cited
to judicial decisions and EEOC guidance, embracing Howlett's position
"that every agreement implicitly incorporated all applicable law." 77
Wolkinson and Liberson concluded that "some arbitrators still adhere
to the position advocated by . . . Meltzer that arbitrators . . . should .
. respect the agreement and ignore the law," while others "apply the
law if there exists a definitive judicial decision bearing on the issue.""7
Perry Zirkel's examination of labor arbitration awards from 1972 to
1982 concluded that external law and other arbitration awards were
considered in approximately 50% of the awards.1 79 His data set
consisted of 100 awards from the BNA Labor Arbitration Reports. 80
Five of the awards interpreted legal precedent or prior awards.181
Attorney representation did not correlate with whether an award
interpreted legal precedent.18 2 His study indicates that one-third of the
awards did not cite or reference external authority.18 3
Patricia Greenfield examined the extent to which arbitrators relied
on external law in 106 arbitration awards decided between 1980 and
1985.184 She used cases in which at least one of the parties had filed an
unfair labor practice charge, necessarily invoking the National Labor
Relations Act.1 85 Her study found that 55 of the 106 cases, 51.9%, "cite
statutory issues" in the discussion section (as opposed to just in the
174. Id. at 16 (emphasis omitted).
175. Id.
176.
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portion of the opinion reciting the parties' positions).18 6 The study
shows that arbitrators cited statutory issues more frequently when the
arbitrator was aware of a related unfair labor practice charge or when
at least one of the parties raised a statutory issue.1 87 Greenfield also
found that the type of case significantly influenced the likelihood that
the arbitrator would address a statutory issue in the discussion section
of the opinion.1 88 In cases claiming discrimination against an employee
because of union activity, called Section 8(a)(3) cases because of the
relevant section of the NLRA, arbitrators addressed statutory issues
more frequently.1 89 They did so in thirty-five of forty-nine, or 71.4%, of
the Section 8(a)(3) cases.1 90 In cases claiming a refusal by an employer
to bargain with the union, called Section 8(a)(5) cases, arbitrators were
significantly less likely to cite statutory issues.19' Arbitrators
addressed a statutory issue in only twelve of the thirty-one, or 38.7%,
of Section 8(a)(5) cases.1 92 Of the fifty-five cases raising statutory
issues, fourteen cited NLRB decisions, 19 accounting for about 25% of
all the cases raising statutory issues and about 13% of the total 106
awards studied. One of Greenfield's primary conclusions is that the
majority of the awards studied failed to "create a record adequate for
review" by the Board,'1 94 which had deferred to the arbitrator's decision.
Despite some arbitrators being competent to address external law
issues, "many cases are disposed of without statutory issues being
addressed either adequately or at all," either by arbitrators or by
Administrative Law Judges.195
Dale Allen and Daniel Jennings surveyed the 641 members of the
National Academy of Arbitrators (NAA) in 1987 regarding their
decision-making processes; they received 296 usable questionnaires.1 96
The questionnaire asked the arbitrators to rank several decisionmaking factors by importance.1 97 Arbitrators ranked state and federal
law lowest of the seven factors.1 98 Allen and Jennings note that the law
has no bearing on the main issue "[i]n the majority of arbitration
cases," and many arbitrators believe that they should "restrict
186.
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themselves merely to examination of the labor agreement."' 9 9 The
study also found that 88% of the arbitrators do not consult published
labor awards "in the majority of decisions," and that 64% "state that
the use of precedent is not significant except for about one-third of the
cases."200
In a 2004 article, Ted St. Antoine reported the results of a survey
he conducted of NAA arbitrators about their use of external
authority. 201 He opened the article by describing the long-standing
debate:
[Y]ears ago Bernie Meltzer and the late Bob Howlett squared off at our
annual meeting in a classic confrontation on an issue that refuses to
die. What should an arbitrator do when there is a seemingly
irreconcilable conflict between a provision of a collective bargaining
agreement and the dictates of external law? 202

He concluded that a cross section of NAA members accept Meltzer's
position, "but when the going gets tough, most of them move over into"
Mittenthal's middle ground approach. 203 St. Antoine received 52
completed questionnaires in response to a message to NAA's unofficial
240-member email list. 204 The results, as we reported in Levinson et
al. (2020) indicated that:
* About half of the arbitrators will cite external law only where
the parties have cited legal authorities.
* About 30% of the arbitrators will cite external law "when it
seems especially pertinent," even if the parties have not cited legal
authorities.
* Around 60% of respondents indicated that they "seldom feel required to deal with the issue of contract versus law" because the
"vast majority of contracts should and can be interpreted as consistent with the law."

* When the contract irreconcilably conflicts with external law, "almost twice as many arbitrators said they would follow the contract,
unless the parties instructed them otherwise, as said they would
follow the law."
* Almost 60% of arbitrators "would not order a party to violate external law as part of their award." 205
A 2005 article by Malin and Jeanne Vonhof noted that "parties'
expectations" about reliance on external authority in FMLA-related
arbitrations "are evolving" because of the "pervasive influence of the
199. Id.
200. Id.
201.
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FMLA," 20 6 and that to the extent parties expect FMLA issues to be
addressed by arbitrators, there is no longer a conflict between
traditional expectations that arbitrators will interpret the CBA as
written and what the law requires.20 7 Malin also noted that Elkouri
and Elkouri found in 2003 that arbitrators decide cases involving the
FMLA by relying on its provisions and the Department of Labor
regulations "without regard to whether the collective bargaining
agreement says anything about the FMLA." 20 8
Mark Weidenmaier explored, in a 2012 article, how frequently
labor awards published by BNA cited external authority. 209 Of the
208 randomly selected awards21 0 he examined, he found that
approximately 48.6% cited to either a judicial opinion or another
arbitration award.2 1' Of those labor awards, 14.9% cited judicial
opinions only.21 2 Of the labor awards citing either a judicial opinion or
another arbitration award, about 76% cited "at least one arbitration
award," and 35.6% "cited only arbitration awards" and not judicial
opinions.213 Within a subset of twenty-five awards, which Weidenmaier
examined more closely, the average number of citations to either
judicial opinions or labor awards was 8.7 unique citations, with an
average of 3.9 being to judicial opinions and 4.5 to arbitration
awards.21 4 The awards in this subset cited an average of "two or more
unique precedents per page of legal analysis."2 1 5 Of these citations, an
average of 2.3 "discussed the cited source in some detail or explicitly
indicated reliance on the source," 216 demonstrating that the arbitrators
"did more than pepper their awards with string citations."2 1 7
Levinson explored, in a 2013 article, how frequently labor
arbitration awards in discrimination cases published by BNA invoked
different forms of external authority.2 1 8 Examining a total of 111
awards involving statutory claims, Levinson found that "[f]orty
decisions cited only the relevant statute or no [external] legal
authority." 219 Seventy-one cited to external authority other than the
206. Martin H. Malin & Jeanne M. Vonhof, The Evolving Role of the Labor Arbitrator,
21 OHIO ST. J. ON DISP. RESOL. 199, 200 (2005).
207. Id. at 200, 239.
208. Malin, supra note 106, at 26 (quoting FRANK ELKOURI & EDNA ASPER ELKOURI,
How ARBITRATION WORKS 520 (Alan Myles Rubin ed., 6th ed. 2003)).
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statute involved." 0 Fifty-two cited judicial opinions, twenty-six cited
other arbitral awards, and thirteen cited EEOC regulations or
guidelines."' And "[s]eventeen [awards] cited a treatise or other
secondary source."2 Thus, approximately 64% of the awards cited to
at least one external legal authority of some kind, and 47% cited to
judicial opinions.
B.

The Weaknesses of Some PriorStudies

Learning and understanding what is actually happening in the
world is notoriously difficult when it comes to human actions in private
settings, and arbitration is no exception. The most we can hope to
accomplish as a scientific matter is to amass the data we can, compare
the biases and weaknesses inherent in the data available in each
study, continue to study the phenomenon with data that is less biased
or mitigates the biases of previous studies, and begin to draw
inferences after many varied studies can be viewed together. When it
comes to understanding labor arbitration, we are at the middle of the
journey, not its end. Our study cannot take us to the end of the journey,
nor can our study be used to draw any definitive policy conclusions.
Nevertheless, our study lacks some of the difficulties present in prior
studies, and it offers a more current glimpse than most studies. Before
we introduce our data, we take a moment to explore some of the
weaknesses of prior studies.
First, as already mentioned, much of the survey data and case
studies are older. In particular, the Edwards; Oppenheimer and
LaVan; Wolkinson and Liberson; Zirkel; Greenfield; and Allen and
Jennings studies all predate both the proliferation of overlap between
legal precedent and CBAs as well as the creation of arbitration as the
exclusive forum for the resolution of employees' statutory rights cases.
Each of these legal developments should lead to greater reliance on
external law than shown in the older studies, and data after 1998
would be particularly helpful to learning about how these changes are
affecting the arbitral process.
Second, many of the prior studies rely on survey data, which the
empirical literature recognizes as unreliable.2 23 To be sure, labor
arbitration is private and very difficult to observe, so survey data is
sometimes the best available evidence of what arbitrators do.
Moreover, surveys can provide a glimpse of the thought processes of
arbitrators. That said, they are plagued by biases due to poor response
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rates and reputational pressures." 4 Reputational pressures tend to
cause survey respondents to answer questions in ways that cast them

in a more positive light or to be more likely to respond as the
respondents think the surveyors would like them to respond." 5 Lessthan-perfect response rates strengthen these biased results in the
sense that those arbitrators who do not wish to answer in "positive"
ways or who do not take care to deal with external sources in deciding
their cases may be more likely to opt out of the survey by not
responding. 226 In the three surveys discussed above, one received
responses from fewer than half the surveyed arbitrators, one received
responses from approximately half of the surveyed arbitrators, and
one received responses from less than 25% of those surveyed. 2 7 While
the information provided is certainly interesting and very
enlightening for some purposes, they are limited and should be supplemented with other empirical evidence of arbitrator behavior.
Third, some of the empirical studies have used arbitrations
published in BNA as the source of data.22 8 Because most arbitration
awards are not made publicly available, the BNA published
arbitrations are a natural source of study. However, the BNA awards
will be biased due to the selection process for BNA publication. In
order for the award to be published in BNA, the arbitrator must
receive the consent of both parties for its publication. Thus, all of the
relevant participants are choosing publication of the award. 229 One
might expect that unanimous consent will result in a skew of published
awards toward those that the arbitrator feels were well-reasoned and
relied on notions of public law and public policy. Awards with missing
or shoddy reasoning and awards that refuse to consider governing laws
would not likely make the selection cut. Again, these studies are
valuable, especially in a world where awards remain private. But the
conclusions that can be drawn from them are limited.
Fourth, some of the studies use arbitrations that are more likely
than most awards to be subsequently reviewed by a government
agency, such as the NLRB or EEOC.23 0 Even if those agencies regularly
224. Id.; FLOYD J. FOWLER, JR., SURVEY RESEARCH METHODS 10-12 (5th ed. 2013) (explaining bias resulting from nonresponse and distorting answers to look good).
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defer to the arbitrations, the potential for review and reversal by the
agencies could influence the arbitrator's decision process. After all, the
arbitrator wants the parties to be satisfied, and one feature of that
satisfaction is to render a decision in ways that help ensure that the
agency will defer to the accomplished agreement. Again, these studies
are valuable, especially to the extent that they illuminate problems
with arbitration notwithstanding the expected biases. But the biases
do create limitations on at least some of the implications and
inferences that the studies generate.
We turn next to our study, which although also inherently limited,
lacks some of the biases and limitations found in prior studies.
IV. OUR STUDY

A.

Research Questions

Similar to previous studies, in our initial article, we explored
whether labor arbitrators actually consider statutes and other
external authority and to what extent.2 31We also began to investigate
whether arbitrators rely on external legal sources more frequently in
certain types of cases. 232 For example, do arbitrators consider external
authority more often in cases involving statutory claims than in those
only involving breach of the CBA? 233 Do they consider external
authority more often in cases involving breach of just cause provisions
("just cause" is a vague term that might require an external source to

illuminate meaning) than in other breach of CBA claims? 234
We are also interested in whether a particular arbitrator's
likelihood of considering external authority varies based on her
attributes. 235 Some labor arbitrators, for example, do not have a J.D.;
Levinson, What the Awards Tell Us, supra note 81, at 830 (studying awards in disputes
involving employment discrimination); Joel Wm. Friedman, The NLRB's Deference and
Abstention Policies: Accommodation or Abdication?, 92 TUL. L. REV. 883, 884 (2018) (The

NLRB "has adopted a policy of withholding the exercise of its undisputed jurisdiction over
statutory claims

in favor

of seeking resolution

of the underlying dispute through

arbitration."); United Parcel Service, Inc., 369 N.L.R.B. 1, 9 (2019) (explaining requirements
for NLRB deferral to an arbitration award); Fort Bend Cty., Texas v. Davis, 139 S. Ct. 1843,
1846-47 (2019) ("As a precondition to the commencement of a Title VII action in court, a

complainant must first file a charge with the Equal Employment Opportunity
Commission."); Alexander v. Gardner-Denver Co., 415 U.S. 36, 59-60 (1974) ("[T]he federal
policy favoring arbitration of labor disputes and the federal policy against discriminatory
employment practices can best be accommodated by permitting an employee to pursue fully
both his remedy under the grievance-arbitration clause of a collective-bargaining agreement
and his cause of action under title VI.").
231.

Levinson et al., supra note 7, at 1851.

232.
233.
234.
235.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
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a lack of legal training might make it less likely that the arbitrator
consults external law. 236 While little is known on the background of
labor arbitrators, as we cite in Levinson et al. 2020: "as of 2000, 61.4%
of NAA arbitrators had J.D.s, 237 and a study of eighty-one labor
1982 and 2005 found
arbitrators' awards issued between
approximately 64.2% had J.D.s." 238 Our data set also includes decisions
made by joint arbitration boards, which are groups of union and
employer representatives who are unlikely to have J.D.s. While we
cannot ascertain precisely from the awards whether a particular
arbitrator does or does not have a J.D., we know the service provider,
such as AAA or FCMS, and the presence of such a service provider
might well be a proxy for whether the arbitrator has a J.D. or is
otherwise exposed to the requisite legal knowledge through training
or otherwise.
Relatedly, perhaps having attorney representation of the parties in
the arbitration increases the likelihood of the arbitrator citing external
authority. Recall that under some views of procedural justice,
arbitrators should address the parties' arguments and evidence in
order to show them that their positions were fully considered. 239
Attorneys may be more likely than other union or management
representatives to cite external authority to the arbitrator when
presenting a case, and so, the arbitrators are more likely to cite it
themselves in their awards.
We summarize our findings here24o to lay the basis for our current
investigation into the implications of this newer and in some
ways, more reliable dataset's implications to determine the extent of
lawlessness in labor arbitration.
B. Research Data
Recognizing the limitations of prior empirical studies, we set out to
create a new and broader database of labor arbitration awards. Our
awards are drawn from the Public Access to Court Electronic Records
federal court electronic docket (PACER). Just as federal courts have
jurisdiction to enforce agreements to arbitrate contained in CBAs, they

236. Id.
237. Id.; Picher et al., supra note 84, at 12; see also Allen & Jennings, supra note 196, at
423 (1987 survey of 296 NAA members found that 51 percent of respondents possessed a law
school education); J. Timothy Sprehe & Jeffery Small, Members and Nonmembers of the

NationalAcademy of Arbitrators: Do They Differ?, 39 ARB. J. 25, 27-28 (1984) (1983 survey
of NAA members and nonmembers found that 54.3% of 1,040 arbitrators on the national
AAA list of labor arbitrators held a law degree).
238. LAURA J. COOPER ET AL., MORE THAN WE HAVE EVER KNOWN ABOUT DISCIPLINE
AND DISCHARGE IN LABOR ARBITRATION: AN EMPIRICAL STUDY 7, 22 (2015).
239.

See supra Section I.C.

240.

Levinson et al., supra note 7.
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also have jurisdiction to enforce arbitration awards.24 ' After 2000,
those awards were made publicly available in PACER. We studied
awards submitted in cases filed in federal court over the course of a
decade. The awards were not confined to a particular arbitration
association such as the AAA, nor were they confined to awards both
parties agreed to publish or to particular types of labor or employment
disputes. In this sense, our data set is broader than previous studies
and more current than many.
In Levinson et al. (2020), we describe how the data set was
constructed:

-

-

We searched on Bloomberg in the PACER database for "employ! and
(arbitral /2 award)." We included all federal district court cases from
2000 to 2011 where the nature of the suit was classified as any of the
following: Civil Rights - Disabilities - Employment [445]; Civil Rights
Employment [442]; Labor - Fair Labor Standards Act [710]; Labor
Family and Medical Leave Act [751]; Labor - Labor/Management
Relations [720]; Labor - Labor/Management Reporting & Disclosure
[730]; Labor - Other Litigation [790]; Other Statutes - Arbitration [896].
We used the broad search term in order to find all cases involving an
arbitration award that dealt with employment or employers. 242

The remainder of this section draws heavily on Levinson et al. to
describe the process we used to assemble our new and broader
database of labor arbitration awards.24 3 A research assistant examined
each docket in all of the resulting cases from the years 2000-2006 and
the docket in each fourth case (because of enormous growth in
available findings over the course of study period) in our results for the
years 2007-2011 to ascertain whether the case involved an arbitration
award and if so, whether the award was available." A case was
considered off-point if there was no award, as in a situation where
arbitration was compelled by a judicial decision, or where a nonemployment-related issue was arbitrated. The research assistants
coded each available award in the on-point cases for citation to
external authority, among other attributes. For this Article, we
excluded employment arbitration awards, narrowing the database to
include only labor arbitration awards (those cases where the entity on
the employee side was a union or where the claim type was a breach
of a CBA). The resulting data set of labor arbitration awards consists
of 602 awards.
Because arbitration is a private process, it is not possible to obtain
all labor arbitration awards for a certain period or to obtain a truly
241. WARE, supra note 3, at 151.
242.

Levinson et al., supra note 7, at 1852.

243. Id. at 1851-55 ("Part III. An Empirical Study of Arbitration Awards").
244. Thirty research assistants examined the dockets over a five-year period. Especially
for cases in 2000 and 2001, the award is often not available in the electronic database, and
we did not have funding to obtain the actual court files with the paper copies of the awards.

476

FLORIDA STATE UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 48:443

randomly selected sample. Thus, no data set of awards can be perfectly
representative. In order to provide any empirical evidence about labor
arbitration and arbitration more generally, we must use a nonrepresentative sample; we do so while acknowledging its limitations.
Our new data set overcomes some of the acknowledged limitations
of the samples of arbitration awards used by previous authors, as
described in Part III, but the data set has limitations of its own. Unlike
BNA, our database includes awards that the parties did not elect to
publish, including handwritten awards by joint arbitration boards.
Our database is not limited to a single service provider, so it is more
representative than others. Our sample can provide insight into
arbitration where the arbitrator was not selected through a service
provider and arbitrations were conducted by a range of other service
providers, including the FMCS and state service providers.
Our data come from PACER, a system that provides access to every
document electronically filed in each federal district court case in the
nation. Because of this, our database does not include many awards
that did not result in a court case-in other words, cases where both
parties were satisfied and complied with the award in the first
instance. However, some of our awards are "confirmed without
opposition," meaning that the parties were satisfied. Other awards
ended up in the data set because they were used as support for an
argument, sometimes by other parties entirely, and so, may have been
complied with by the parties involved in the arbitration without their
own litigation. Most awards in our data set, however, are awards that
led to a court case because one party to the arbitration was unsatisfied.
Many parties file a case in federal district court in an effort to
vacate an award with which they are dissatisfied, although the
standard for vacating an arbitration award is strict. A labor award can
be vacated only when: 1) "the award results from procedural
unfairness, such as fraud, corruption, or bias"; 2) the arbitrator
"clearly exceeded" his authority to interpret the CBA "by contravening
a clear provision"; or 3) the award itself, not the CBA provision,
"violates a fundamental and well-defined public policy."245 Because our
data set likely overrepresents awards with which one party was
dissatisfied (and presumably also thought they had a chance of
meeting the narrow legal standard), we might adjust our expectations
of what our study accomplishes accordingly. For instance, perhaps
awards citing external authority are less likely to be contested in court
because the parties perceive them as more authoritative.
Alternatively, perhaps, they are more likely to be contested because a
party objects to the reliance on external law.
As mentioned above, however, our data set also includes a
substantial number of awards that the parties did not dispute. It
245. WARE & LEVINSON, supra note 16, at 190 (marks omitted).
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contains 258 cases, approximately 42.86% of the total, where the
award was not challenged. 246 It is not uncommon for unions to seek to
"confirm" labor awards because they are not self-enforcing. In these
cases, the union files in federal district court to confirm the award and
either the employer does not appear, so that a default judgment issues,
or the employer stipulates to the confirmation. Our data set also
includes cases where one of the parties to the litigation cites to an
arbitration award as relevant authority. The prior award could deal
with the same fact pattern and parties involved in the litigation.
Alternatively, it could involve a dispute between completely different
parties than those involved in the more recent arbitration, with the
citation signifying that the prior arbitration is relevant to the court
case. In the latter category of cases, the award is being used as
persuasive authority (as a court opinion or administrative agency
decision would be), and the parties to the arbitration did not dispute
the outcome of the cited award, nor did the parties to the arbitration
directly dispute the award in the former category of cases (which we
know because no one has moved to vacate it). Rather, they may
disagree over whether the court should rule similarly to how the
arbitrator ruled in the dispute. The cases that invoke a former
arbitration award in this way include unlawful employment
discrimination cases brought under Title VII and other antidiscrimination statutes, wage and hour cases, Family and Medical
Leave Act (FMLA) cases, and a broad range of other types of labor and
employment law disputes, such as those involving whistleblowers,
breach of duty of fair representation, wrongful discharge in violation
of public policy, intentional infliction of emotional distress, due
process, and the Employee Retirement Income Security Act (ERISA).
More of the awards in our data set are drawn from later years than
from earlier years, given our reliance on an electronic database that
was growing in court participation over the study period. Thus, results
generated from cases decided in the mid-2000s paint a more accurate
picture of labor awards issued nationally than do the awards
generated in the early 2000s, when fewer district courts were
submitting electronic records. Nevertheless, cases from the early
2000s provide an accurate sense of individual district courts, and we
have no reason to believe limited court participation biases our data in
any particular direction.
This is the second of five planned articles studying labor arbitration
awards with this data set. The first article examined arbitrator
reliance on external authority to determine the extent to which
arbitrators rely on legal authority.2 47 The third will examine reliance
246. These cases were each coded as 0=no challenge indicated. The resolution in these
cases ranges from being settled or dismissed not on the merits, confirmation of an award by
default judgment, or confirmation of an award not via default judgment.
247.

See generally Levinson et al., supra note 7.

478

FLORIDA STATE UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 48:443

on prior labor awards to provide a sense of the degree to which
nonlegal external sources influence arbitration. The fourth will report
on arbitrator attributes recently added to our dataset and further
explore the impact of arbitrator attributes, including whether they
have a J.D., on the awards. A fifth will focus on the degree to which
arbitrator citation to external authority influences the outcomes of
subsequent court litigation over their enforcement. The fourth may
provide an opportunity to consider further the extent of lawlessness in
labor arbitration, which is the issue explored in this current Article
that builds upon the findings initially reported in our first article.
V. THE RESEARCH FINDINGS

Section A of this Part sets out our findings on the frequency with
which awards cite to external legal authority248 and concludes that
when we use a data set that eliminates inherent biases toward citing
external legal authority, the incidence of even acknowledging the
presence of external authority, let alone relying on it, is shockingly
low. Section B looks at whether certain attributes of the arbitration
proceedings correlate with the citation to external authority and finds
that arbitrations using service providers or attorney representation

are more likely to have arbitrators mention external legal authority in
their awards.
Section C tests for whether certain types of labor arbitration
disputes are correlated more highly with citation to external authority.
We find that labor arbitrations involving statutory claims are slightly
more likely to cite external legal authority than are claims based on
breach of the CBA, but the results required modification in order to be
statistically significant. Furthermore, and surprisingly, no CBA claim
based on the CBAs' nondiscrimination provisions cited to external
authority. Although we can of course draw no firm conclusions based
on this one study with its own limitations, our results, taken together,
suggest that labor arbitration may be lawless when it comes to
statutory rights based on discrimination-the very place that the law
needs to have independent force to be effective. Finally, breaches of the
CBAs' just cause provisions were more likely to cite to external legal
authority than were breaches of other CBA provisions.
A.

Rates of Citation to ExternalAuthority

This section examines the number of awards that cite to external
legal authority, specifically statutes, cases, and administrative
authority, or to secondary sources.

248. Some awards cite to other labor arbitration awards, and we will share these findings
in a third article focused on the use of arbitral "precedent" in labor arbitration.
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1. Citation to Statutes
As reflected in Figure 1 and noted in our prior article, 249 only
seventeen of the 602 awards in our database cite to and follow or rely
on a statute. This is approximately 2.82% of the awards. Eleven
additional awards mention a statute but do not address it in the
analysis. Five awards mention a statutory issue and explicitly decline
to address it. Overall, 565 of the awards, approximately 94%, do not
mention a statute at all.2 5 0
Figure 1: Award Cites Statute. N = 602

Citation to Statutes
2.82%

0.83%

0.66%

1.83%
* No statute cited (N=565)

Cited but ignored (N=11)

Cited and followed (N=17)

* Cited but not followed (N=5)

Unknown (N=4)

93.85%

At first blush, these results are shockingly dismal. Although labor
arbitration scholars claim that reliance on statutes has increased over
the years,2 5 our data indicate that during the 2000s, arbitrators did
not cite to statutes in the vast majority of awards. While other studies
of awards have found much higher percentages of awards relying on
statutes, those studies were distinct in that they addressed specific
situations of prohibited discrimination, such as on the basis of race or

249.

Levison et al., supra note 7, at 1856.

250. In two instances, we had only part of the award, so we could not code for whether
or not a statute was relied on during arbitration.

251. Wolkinson & Liberson, supra note 176, at 44; Malin & Vonhof, supra note 206, at
200.

480

FLORIDA STATE UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 48:443

sex,25 or cases known to have raised an NLRA issue, 253 and
importantly, the arbitrations taking place in those contexts
contemplated federal agency review of the awards. Moreover, some of
these studies use BNA data, with the limitations we discussed earlier.
Outside of these rarified contexts, it appears that arbitrators continue
to view their role as the facilitator of a purely private governance
system. And such data indicate that arbitration may be somewhat
lawless when it comes to acknowledging governing statutory law.
On the other hand, perhaps the results are not quite as shocking as
they appear at first blush. Because the vast majority of the
arbitrations in our data set involve claims involving breach of the CBA
rather than statutory claims, this dearth of reliance on statutes makes
sense. Recall from our discussion in Part III.A of the survey responses
of arbitrators that arbitrators indicated that in most cases they need
not consider a statute, often because only a contractual breach is at
issue. 254 Even so, arbitration scholars have recognized the growing
overlap of claims that constitute both a breach of the CBA and a
statutory claim,25 suggesting that this rationale is limited.
Our data also indicate that in very few awards, just five in total,
arbitrators explicitly followed the Meltzer approach and affirmatively
declined to address a statutory issue presented to them. This result is
admittedly speculative because we can only observe awards where the
arbitrator chose to discuss that a statutory issue was raised. This may
be a situation where, as discussed earlier, saying less helps to insulate
the award from later judicial challenge. In another handful of cases,
eleven awards mention a statute but do not apply it. Here too, one of
the parties likely mentioned a statute, but the arbitrator omitted its
treatment in the award's reasoning. With little elaboration, it is
difficult to tell whether the arbitrator was willfully ignoring relevant
statutory law or determined that the statute was not relevant to
resolving the dispute. Still, overall, we can say that arbitrators very
rarely explicitly reject governing statutory law in their awards.

252. Oppenheimer & LaVan, supra note 168, at 13 (finding 60% of 86 BNA labor
arbitration awards, from 1970-75, dealing with discrimination cited a federal or state statute

or EEOC guidelines).
253. Greenfield, supra note 184, at 689 (finding 51.9% of 106 labor arbitration awards,
from 1981-85, related to NLRB cases cited "relevant statutory provisions").
254.

Allen & Jennings, supra note 196, at 428; St. Antoine, ExternalLaw in Arbitration,

supra note 107, at 189-90.
255. See Malin, supra note 106, at 15, 25-26 (discussing overlap between FMLA and
CBAs); Nolan, supra note 146, at 11 ("[T]he enormous outpouring of laws regulating
employment ... made it almost impossible to avoid potential conflicts between contracts and
external law."); Baldwin, supra note 144, at 31, 39 (same).
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2. Citation to cases
In addition to the dearth of reliance on statutes, our data indicate
that arbitrators are only somewhat more likely to incorporate judicial
opinions into their reasoning. As shown in Figure 2,256 seventy-eight,
or only approximately 13%, of the awards cite to at least one judicial
opinion.
Figure 2: Award Cites Judicial Opinion. N = 602

Citation to Cases
12.96%050

® No cases cited (N=521)

Case cited or relied on (N=78)

* Unknown (N=3)

86.54%

The percentage of awards citing judicial opinions in our database is
decidedly lower than the approximately 25% finding in Weidenmaier's
study of 208 BNA labor cases.25 7 The difference likely reflects the fact
that published awards are more likely than unpublished awards to cite
to judicial opinions. Moreover, published awards likely include a
narrower subset of cases than are found in our data set. For example,
Weidenmaier's data set included 137 discipline or discharge cases
(approximately 65.87%) and 71 other cases.2 58 Our data set includes
208 discipline or discharge cases 259 (approximately 34.55%) and 394
other cases. Because cases involving just cause are more likely to cite
external authority than other types of cases, the prior studies relying
256.

This data is also reported in our prior article. See Levinson et al., supra note 7, at

1859.
257. Weidenmaier's study reported that 101 of the 208 cases (48.6%) cited to either an
arbitration award or judicial opinion. Of those 101, 55.4% cited a judicial opinion, leading us
to conclude that 56 of the 208, approximately 27% of the total, cited to a judicial opinion.
Weidenmaier, supra note 19, at 1114 fig.2, 1145 tbl.A-1.
258. Id. at 1105 tbl.1.
259. Coded as cases where a collective bargaining agreement is allegedly breached as
involving a just cause provision (states employees can be disciplined only for good reason).
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on databases including more discipline cases may overrepresent the
extent labor arbitrators are citing to authority. If so, the tension
between the goals of workplace arbitration and lawlessness are more
prominent than previously believed. Here too, a broader set of
arbitration awards yields differing results than prior studies and
indicates that labor arbitration awards are more lawless, at least in
the sense of their failure to rely on primary legal sources, than
previously understood.260
If we can identify protections that increase the likelihood of reliance
on legal authority without significantly reducing the efficiency and
workplace focus of labor arbitrations, then lawlessness would be less
of a concern, given the robustness of reliance on court opinions when
they are cited. Once an arbitrator uses case authority in his reasoning,
our data set indicates that the robustness of his reliance is consistent
with the findings of other studies. 261 The awards in our database citing
judicial opinions cite an average of 3.68 opinions each, with a median
of two judicial opinions cited. 262 The average is consistent with
Weidenmaier's finding that among twenty-five BNA labor award cases
citing external authority, the average number of judicial opinions cited
was 3.9.263 Although we cannot draw any definitive conclusions from
these results, one might tentatively postulate that although most
arbitrators do not consider external legal authority at all, those who
do incorporate case law are willing to embrace that exercise somewhat
robustly. Because our findings discussed below indicate that use of
service providers and attorneys postitively correlate with citation to
external authority, these two protections or similar protections, such
as vetting and training arbitrators in a way similar to service providers, could decrease the potential for arbitral lawlessness.

260. Other types of indicators of lawlessness include whether businesses are providing
for arbitration for the purpose of avoiding mandatory legal rules, whether arbitrators' practices differ from those of judges, and whether arbitrators follow other arbitration awards.
Drahozal, supra note 9, at 190-91.
261.

Levinson et al., supra note 7, at 1860.

262. Id.
263. Weidenmaier, supra note 19, at 1120-21 tbl.3.
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3. Citation to Administrative Authority
Figure 3 shows that of the 602 awards, 23 awards (approximately
4%) cite to administrative authority, such as administrative agency
rules, regulations, guidelines, opinion letters, or findings. 264
Figure 3: Award Cites Administrative Authority. N = 602

Citation to Administrative Sources
3.82%

0.66%

* No administrative sources cited

(N=575)
Administrative sources cited or
relied on (N=23)
® Unknown (N=4)

95.51%

Like citation of statutes and judicial opinions, citation of
administrative authority is an important indicator of the extent to
which arbitrators rely on external law in their decision-making
processes. 265 Administrative authority, such as NLRB decisions and
EEOC regulations, relates to a wide variety of employment-related
disputes in a manner similar to judicial opinions. Our study provides
a new data point regarding how frequently labor awards cite to
administrative authority. The finding of 4% is lower than the previous
finding of citation to administrative authority of approximately 13%266
and approximately 11.71%.267 These studies focused on cases alleging
discrimination or a violation of the NLRA, likely biasing their results
higher than found in our data set. Here too, with all the same caveats,
we find a greater sense of lawlessness in arbitration than indicated in
previous studies.

264. This data was previously reported in Levinson et al., supra note 7, at 1860-61 fig.3.
265.

Oppenheimer & LaVan, supra note 168, at 13; Wolkinson & Liberson, supra note

176, at 44.
266. Greenfield,

supra note 184, at 690-92; see also supra notes 192-193

and

accompanying text for calculation of the 13.
267.

See Levinson, What the Awards Tell Us, supra note 81, at 830. This is calculated by

dividing the total 111 cases by 13 citing EEOC cases.

484

FLORIDA STATE UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 48:443

4. Citation to Secondary Sources
As reflected in Figure 4,268 of the 602 awards, 79 awards (approximately 13%) cite a secondary source. Secondary sources include any
other authority that describes legal rules or governing precedent, including but not limited to treatises and services that discuss cases,
other legal authority, or other labor arbitration awards.
Figure 4: Award Cites Secondary Sources. N = 602

Citation to Secondary Sources
13.12%4

0.66%

® No secondary sources cited

(N=519)
Secondary sources cited or

relied on (N=79)
Unknown (N=4)

86.21%

We included citation to secondary sources because some courts rely
on secondary sources for established principles of law, and arbitrators
likely do also. We hypothesized, without examination, that arbitrators
may rely on secondary sources to a greater extent than some courts do
for a variety of reasons, such as not having as extensive access to
judicial opinions, not being attorneys and so relying on summaries
provided by attorneys, or having more limited time. Reliance on
secondary sources provides a more efficient and less expensive method
for arbitrators to assure they are considering the law without having
to do in-depth research of statutory, case, and administrative law.
Only two studies examine the use of secondary sources by labor
arbitrators. Edwards' survey found that 52% of labor arbitrators
reviewed labor advance sheets, which were a form of secondary source
in common use in the 1970s. 269 Of course, reviewing and citing or
relying on such sources in fashioning an award are two very different
exercises, so the survey data cannot serve as a direct comparison to
our results. Levinson is the only other study to actually examine
268. Levinson et al., supra note 7, at 1862 fig.4.
269. Edwards, supra note 2, at 71.
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reliance on secondary sources.2 70 She found that 17 of 111 BNA
published labor arbitration awards (approximately 15.32%) cited
secondary sources.2" That study focused on published discrimination
cases,2 7 2 so we would expect her findings to reflect greater reliance on
secondary authorities. Instead, her findings are very similar to that
found in our current, broader data set. This unexpected similarity is
worthy of further exploration. The fact that data sets biased in favor
of greater reliance on legal authority do not also reflect biases in
reliance on secondary authority may indicate at least an implicit
appreciation that secondary sources are not "law" per se. Moreover, it
might suggest that reliance on other labor arbitration awards,
themselves reflections of the world of private governance, would not be
subject to the same biases that encourage greater reliance on external
legal authority. We leave to a later article a deeper exploration of
arbitrator reliance on labor arbitration awards because the question of
whether the awards temper or fuel lawlessness is nuanced and worthy
of its own extended investigation.
5. Overall Citation to External Authority and Its Implications
As previously reported, of the 602 awards, 99 awards
(approximately 16.4%) cite to at least one statute, judicial opinion, or
administrative authority. 273 Five hundred three awards (more than
83%) cite no external authority, other than possibly a secondary
authority.27 4 Our finding of 16% is substantially lower than the rates
reported by previous authors. In Oppenheimer's sample, 60% of labor
arbitration awards cited a statute or regulation,2 7 5 and in Greenfield's
sample, 51.9% of labor arbitration awards addressed statutory
issues. 276 Again, the lower number in our study may be due to the
larger number of cases in our data set that are purely contractual
disputes that do not relate to statutory law, while the other studies
focused on discrimination and cases alleging an NLRA violation. Yet
even Zirkel's study, which did not focus on statutory-like claims,
concluded that only a third of cases did not involve external
authority,2 7 7 in contrast to our finding of more than 83%.278
Nevertheless, our study indicates that reliance on external legal
authority does not appear to be increasing, and it indicates that the
270.

Levinson, What the Awards Tell Us, supra note 81, at 830.

271. Id.
272. Id. at 810.
273.

Levinson et al., supra note 7, at 1863.

274. Id. at 1863.
275. Oppenheimer & LaVan, supra note 168, at 13.
276. Greenfield, supra note 184, at 689.
277.

Perry A. Zirkel, The Use of External Law in Labor Arbitration: An Analysis of

ArbitralAwards, 1985 Det. C.L. Rev. 31, 43-44 (1985).
278.

Levinson et al., supra note 7, at 1863.
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vast majority of arbitrations deal exclusively with norms of private
governance. Our 16% seems more in line with old survey data that, in
general, arbitrators do not rely on external authority.
Of the cases citing external authority-at least one statute, judicial
opinion, or administrative authority-the majority cite only judicial
opinions. Of the ninety-nine awards citing external authority, sixtyseven awards (approximately 66.7%) cite only judicial opinions (one or
more), and no statute or administrative authority. Thirteen of the
ninety-nine awards (approximately 13%) cite more than one of the
three types of external authority-statute, judicial opinion, and
administrative authority. Three of the awards cite a statute and one
or more judicial opinions, while one cites a statute and one or more
administrative documents. Only seven of the ninety-nine awards cite
only a statute.
Overall, the raw numbers indicate that, despite widespread
recognition that today's arbitration often requires that arbitrators
incorporate legal principles into their decisions, most continue to
follow the advice of Meltzer by treating the workplace as a system of
purely private governance. This result is particularly troubling for the
period of time that our study covers. By the early 2000s, some of the
federal circuit courts were already concluding that Wright signaled
that the CBA could, under certain circumstances, commit the
employees to resolve their statutory claims exclusively through
binding arbitration.279 And in 2009, prior to the end of this study, the
Pyett case had made this possibility available throughout the United
States.28 0 And yet, despite this legal development, arbitratorbehaviors
regarding reliance on external authority seem to have remained static.
Prior studies unwittingly masked the degree to which arbitration
has remained lawless by focusing on those rarified awards that were
made publicly available. In those cases, public scrutiny likely was
known or anticipated at the time the award was rendered, and such a
filter might well have influenced prior results. Put together, prior
studies indicate that labor arbitrators much more regularly rely on
external legal authority, and they thus imply that labor arbitration
manages to accomplish two policy goals at once: It (1) promotes
workplace harmony by facilitating well-functioning private workplace
governance systems, and (2) vindicates individual employees'
statutory rights provided in state and federal law. Our new and
broader study of labor arbitration suggests that, without outside
review or training, there is an inevitable tension between these two

279.

14 Penn Plaza LLC v. Pyett, 556 U.S. 247, 255 (2009) (noting that "[w]e granted

certiorari to address the issue left unresolved in Wright, which continues to divide the Courts
of Appeals, and now reverse" (citing federal appellate court cases) (internal citation

omitted)).
280. Id.
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goals. When employers, unions, employees, and arbitrators have an
incentive to further the first goal, the latter goal is at risk.
This conclusion is tentative at best for several reasons. First, while
prior data is biased toward greater reliance on external legal
authority, our data may reflect some bias in the opposite direction.
More studies are needed, to be sure. Second, most of our arbitrations
involve CBA disputes rather than purely statutory disputes, so our
study is not ideal for drawing widespread conclusions about statutory
rights. That said, many CBA claims also relate to statutory claims
under antidiscrimination laws, FMLA, and wage and hour laws, and
thus, the overall lack of citation to legal authority seems troubling. In
addition, many contractual and common law employment legal
principles are designed to nudge the parties toward or outright require
more employee protections, so it seems troubling to one author that
they rarely enter the decision equation in our awards. Again, more
studies are needed. Third, we leave to a later article a fuller
exploration of reliance on prior labor arbitration awards, which could
in part contain the relevant governing legal principles. We look
forward to reporting on that study soon.
Even if we had full confidence in the picture of labor arbitration
painted by our awards, there still remains the question of what an
optimal citation to external legal sources should be. Surely very
thorough and exhaustive research and citation would make labor
arbitration time-consuming and expensive, which, on average, likely
would not benefit either employees or their workplaces. Our study does
show that the awards are citing external authority in a significant
minority of cases. Might that be sufficient? Our instinct, especially
given the incredibly low citation to statutory authority, is no. In any
event, our study shows that labor arbitration can be studied in new
ways, and our preliminary results show that the assumption that labor
arbitrators increasingly rely on external legal authority may not be
true. In short, we think we have demonstrated the need for more
studies to identify whether the shortcomings we have observed are
real and significant to the arbitration outcomes.
B. Attributes of the ArbitrationProceeding that May Affect
the Likelihood of Citation to ExternalAuthority

'

If certain attributes of arbitration result in more reliance on legal
authority, then those attributes might decrease the risk of
lawlessness. We studied whether the use of a service provider, such as
the AAA or FMCS, increases citation to external authority and
whether the presence of an attorney for at least one party increases
reliance on external authority.2 8

281. Levinson et al., supra note 7, at 1866-71.
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We coded for whether the arbitration was conducted under the
auspices of a service provider and, if so, the identity of the provider for
each award. Many labor arbitrations take place under the supervision
of the AAA or the FMCS. The significance is that these organizations
vet the arbitrators, making sure they have prior experience, and train
the arbitrators, 282 so that they use best practices-presumably
including addressing law for statutory claims-and are more likely to
have a higher number of attorney arbitrators on their lists than might
be experienced elsewhere. Even non-attorney arbitrators working with
the larger arbitration associations are required to participate in
training programs where they are likely exposed to relevant governing
legal principles and sources for learning more about such legal
principles. In contrast, some labor arbitrations are decided by joint
grievance boards, an arbitratornamed in the contract, or an arbitrator
selected by the parties. These arbitrators are more likely to be
laypeople with industry experience and less likely to be attorneys-or
provided with relevant legal training-than we observe with service
provider arbitration.28 3 Thus, we hypothesized that arbitration
conducted through service providers are more likely to produce awards
that at least mention external legal authority than are arbitrations
conducted without them.
Similarly, because survey data indicates that arbitrators are more
likely to mention external legal authority when one or both parties rely
on that authority in their cases, we coded for whether attorney
representation in the arbitration proceedings influenced whether the
arbitration award cited to legal authority. Using the reasoning we just
applied to attorney arbitrators, some of us hypothesized that
representation by attorneys would increase citation to external legal
authority. One of us, who has experience in labor arbitrations and who
has long followed the literature on lay labor arbitration, hypothesized
that non-lawyer union and management representation would be
equally effective at citing relevant external authority due to the fact
that relevant legal knowledge is part of the training for this position.
Zirkel's study found no correlation between representation by an
attorney and citation to external authority. 24
This section first presents the data that addresses whether the
parties are using any service provider and data that addresses
whether using a particular service provider correlates with citation to
external authority. Second, it assesses whether arbitrations where any
282. The AAA National Roster of Arbitrators and Mediators:EXPERTISE MATTERS,
AM. ARBITRATION ASS'N: ARBITRATORS & MEDIATORS, https://www.adr.org/aaa-panel
[https://perma.cc/8YWC-JMD3] (last visited Jan. 10, 2021); 29 C.F.R. § 1404.5 (2019); La Rue
& Symonette, supra note 72, at 226.
283.

Levinson et al., supra note 7, at 1835; WARE & LEVINSON, supra note 16, at 208;

Levinson, What the Awards Tell Us, supra note 81, at 830.
284. Zirkel, supra note 179, at 42.
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of the parties are represented by attorneys are more likely to yield
awards that cite external authority.
1. Service ProviderArbitratorsCite More to External Authority
As previously reported, a large number of the awards in our data
set, almost three-fourths, have no service provider indicated.28 5 This
provides an excellent opportunity to compare previously reported rates

of citation to law to a data set with presumably higher numbers of nonservice provider cases. As Table 1 shows, of the 503 awards that cite
no external authority (statute, judicial opinion, or administrative
authority), 355 (approximately 71%) are awards where there is no
indication of a service provider. In sixty-six (approximately 13%) of
those 503 awards, the FMCS was used, and in fifty awards (approximately 10%), the AAA was used.

TABLE 1
For the awards that cite no statute, judicial opinion, or administrative
authority, how are the various service providers represented?
No External Authority
Percentage of Cases

No Service Provider

355

70.58%

AAA

50

9.94%

FMCS

66

13.12%

JAMS

0

0.00%

State Service

30

5.96%

Court ordered/annexed

0

0.00%

National Mediation Board
Dispute Prevention
Resolution, Inc.

1

0.20%

1

0.20%

&

Number of Cases

Total

503
100.00%
As Table 2 shows, of the ninety-nine awards that cite to any type of
external authority (statute, judicial opinion, or administrative
authority), forty-seven awards (approximately 47%) have no indication
of a service provider. Twenty-one awards (approximately 21%) indicate
that FMCS was used, and twenty cases (approximately 20%) indicate
that AAA was used.

285.

Levinson et al., supra note 7, at 1868.
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TABLE 2
What is the numeric and percentage breakdown of service providers
for the awards that do cite to a statute, judicial opinion, or
administrative regulation?
External Authority
Percentage of Cases

47

47.47%

AAA

20

20.20%

FMCS

21

21.21%

JAMS

1

1.01%

State Service

8

8.08%

Court ordered/annexed

1

1.01%

National Mediation Board

1

1.01%

Dispute Prevention
Resolution, Inc.

0

0.00%

Total

99

100.00%

&

Number of Cases
No Service Provider

As shown in Table 3, when comparing the seventy AAA awards to
the eighty-seven FMCS awards, we found no statistically significant
difference between the rate at which the respective servicers' awards
cite external authority (approximately 29% for AAA cases and 24% for
FMCS cases). When comparing the 402 awards in the database with
no indication of a service provider to those authored by an AAA or
FMCS arbitrator, we found that a statistically significant higher
proportion of awards authored by service provider arbitrators cite to
external authority. Only approximately 12% of the awards without a
service provider reflected citations to external authority. We used a
two-tailed T-test run on STATA to determine whether the differences
were statistically significant.
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TABLE 3
No Service Provider
(N=402)

External Authority

No External Authority

47

11.69%

355

88.31%

20

28.57%

50

71.43%

21

24.14%

66

75.86%

AAA
(N=70)

FMCS
(N=87)

Note: There is statistically significant difference in the citation to
external authority between no service provider and AAA (at the 1%
level) and between no service provider and FMCS (at the 1% level),
but there is not a statistically significant difference in the citation
to external authority between AAA and FMCS.
Even when joint boards, which are less likely than arbitrators to
write an opinion to accompany an award, are excluded, arbitrators
appointed by the AAA and FMCS cite external authority at a higher
rate than those who are not. One hundred twenty-one of the 402
awards where no service provider was used (approximately 30.10%)
were decided by joint boards or similar groups of industry experts
rather than a traditional arbitrator or panel of arbitrators. Two
hundred eighty-one of these awards were decided by an arbitrator or
panel of arbitrators. As reflected in Table 4, when we compare these
281 awards to those written by arbitrators appointed by the AAA and
FMCS, we found forty-five (approximately 16%) of the awards
indicating no service provider cite to external authority, whereas
twenty and twenty-one awards respectively of the AAA and FMCS
awards (approximately 24%) cite to external authority, a statistically
significant difference.
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TABLE 4
No Service Provider, Individual or
Panel Arbitrator
(N=281)

External Authority

No External Authority

45

16.01%

236

83.99%

20

28.57%

50

71.43%

21

24.14%

66

75.86%

AAA
(N=70)

FMCS
(N=87)

Note: There is statistically significant difference in the citation to
external authority between no service provider using an individual
or panel arbitratorand AAA (at the 5% level) and between no service
provider using an individual or panel arbitrator and FMCS (at the
1% level).
While the results are consistent with our hypothesis, we cannot say
whether the differences reflect better legal training, more care taken
in providing reasoning in the arbitration awards, or selection of
arbitrators from service providers in the types of cases that involve
legal issues. The care in writing awards may be a reflection of the fact
that service provider arbitration is more costly, and a greater
willingness to incur such costs may also indicate a greater willingness
to pay for a carefully reasoned award. Conversely, the lack of a service
provider may reflect the parties' desire for quick, cheap dispute
resolution. Even so, perhaps parties should be educated about the
relative lawlessness of the more efficient processes. In any event, this
is an area where more studies are warranted.
2. Citation to External Authority Rises with Legal Representation
One might assume that when attorneys represent one or more
parties at hearings, the resulting awards would contain more external
authority references because attorneys have been trained to cite
authority and do so regularly in administrative proceedings and court.
Therefore, they should be more likely than non-attorneys to cite
statutes, case law, and administrative authority to the arbitrator,
which in turn is likely to yield awards that cite external authority.
According to the data reflected in Table 5,286 of the 384 awards in
connection with which at least one party was represented by an
attorney,287 eighty-three (approximately 22%) cited external authority.
286.

This data was reported in our prior study. Levinson et al., supra note 7, at 1868-71.

287. These included cases where representation of the employee or the employer was
coded as representation by in-house counsel, attorney representation by outside counsel, or

2021]

IS LABOR ARBITRATION LAWLESS?

493

In contrast, of the 100 awards where no party was represented by an
attorney, 288 only nine (approximately 8%) cited external authority-a
statistically significant difference indicating that one or both parties'
representation by an attorney correlates with citation to external
authority in the ultimate award.

TABLE 5
External Authority

No External Authority

Attorney
(N=384)

83

21.61%

301

78.39%

No Attorney
(N=110)

9

8.18%

101

91.82%

Note: There is a statistically significant difference in citation to
external authority when an attorney is involved and citation to
external authority when no attorney is involved (at the 1% level).
Prior studies suggested that parties' citation to external authority
would increase the likelihood that an arbitrator would cite it in her
award. Edwards' study found that while the large majority of
arbitrators generally believed that they should not consider external
authority, 97% agreed that if both the parties cited applicable law in
their submissions then the arbitrator should consider it. 289 St.
Antoine's survey found that about half of the arbitrators will cite
external law only where the parties have done so in their
submissions. 290 The current study empirically verifies the general
phenomenon expressed in these survey claims, although we are unable
to tell from the data when external authority is being raised by the
advocates.
What motivates arbitrators to cite to authority raised by the parties
is unclear. Perhaps, as mentioned earlier, best practices require
arbitrators to address the parties' arguments, legal and otherwise. Or
perhaps legally-trained arbitrators cite authority only when they
think it will be helpful to the parties and they believe the lawyers will
be more persuaded by authority or better able to understand it. Or
perhaps lawyers are more likely to represent the parties in the types
of dispute in which external authority has relevance to its proper
resolution or where the resolution of the case is difficult and thus more
nuanced reasoning is warranted. Finally, perhaps the arbitrator
worries that when attorneys are involved in an arbitration, court
attorney representation but was indeterminate whether counsel was in-house or outside

counsel.
288. These included cases where representation of both the employee or the employer
was coded as either no attorney representation or no appearance.

289. Edwards, supra note 2, at 79.
290. St. Antoine, supra note 107, at 189-90.
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review of the award is more likely. Whatever the motivation, the
influence seems clear.
While it is generally more expensive to hire an attorney rather than
having a business representative or human resources expert represent
the parties in arbitration, the data indicate that greater expense leads
to greater consideration of the law. We tentatively conclude that risk
of lawlessness is decreased by attorney representation.
C.

Claim Type and Citation to ExternalAuthority

Presumably, some legal claims are easier to resolve without resort
to external legal authority than are others. When an arbitrator must
resolve a dispute based on clear language in the CBA, presumably she
focuses the bulk of her attention on fact-finding and may have little
need to consult legal authority. Claims not based on the CBA, claims
with statutory counterparts, and claims based on vague CBA language
that needs interpretation or meaning are more likely to need
assistance from external sources.
This section explores whether the type of claim affects the
likelihood that arbitrators cite to external authority. First, we explore
whether claims based on statutory rights are more likely to cite to
external authority. Second, we explore whether citation to external
authority is more likely in certain types of CBA claims than in others.
1. Statutory Claims May Be More Likely to ProduceAwards That
Cite ExternalAuthority
Because, by definition, a statutory claim involves statutory
authority external to the CBA, we predicted that awards resolving
statutory claims would cite external authority more often than would
awards that do not resolve statutory claims. As shown in Table 6, of
the forty-five arbitrations in which a party asserted a statutory claim,
nine awards (approximately 20%) cite to external authority. 291 Of the
557 cases in which no statutory claim was brought, 90 awards
(approximately 16%) cite to external authority. This result comports
with our expectation that external authority would be cited more often
in arbitrations involving a statutory claim, but, surprisingly, the
difference is not statistically significant. Our results might lack power
because only a small number of cases cite external authority.
Alternatively, arbitrators might be citing authority with equal
frequency in CBA disputes, either because some particular types of
CBA disputes also are heavily dependent on legal authority or because
any case-CBA or not-that is not resolved during the first several
steps of workplace dispute resolution, is likely to be difficult-thus, an
equally good candidate for relying on external assistance.
291.

This data was reported in our prior study. Levinson et al., supra note 7, at 1873.
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TABLE 6
Statutory Claim
(N=45)

External Authority

No External Authority

9

20.00%

36

80.00%

90

16.16%

467

83.84%

No Statutory

Claim
(N=557)

Because of the small number of awards in our data set addressing
a statutory claim (forty-five), we were unable to ascertain whether
arbitrators of different types of statutory claims, such as Title VII
versus ERISA, were more likely to cite external authority. No award
in our sample citing external authority involved ERISA; however,
twenty-one of those that do not cite any external authority involved
ERISA. We would not expect ERISA cases that involve an employer's
failure to pay into an ERISA-governed benefit fund to cite external
authority because normally, the union or trust fund only needs to
establish the failure to pay and the amount owed, which are purely
factual questions that do not require reliance on authority.292 Indeed,
a review of the twenty-one awards in our data set discloses that nineteen of the twenty one cases involved a failure to pay amounts owed to
benefit funds, 293 and sixteen were default arbitration awards where
the employer did not contest the non-payment. 294 Of the remaining
two, one involved a factual dispute 295 and the other involved an
interpretation of only the CBA, as stipulated by the parties, and not of

292. Levinson et al., supra note 7, at 1873-74.
293.

See, e.g., Int'l Union of Operating Eng'rs Local 825 v. R.E. Pierson Constr., Co., No.

1:11-cv-07469 (D.N.J. Dec. 23, 2011) (BNA Court Docket); Int'l Union of Operating Eng'rs
Local 825 v. Statewide Hiway, No. 1:10-cv-00386 (D.N.J. Jan. 22, 2010) (BNA Court Docket);
California Drywall/Lathing Indus. Labor-Mgmt. Coop. Comm. v. Alvarado, No. 3:06-cv-

01576 (N.D. Cal. Feb. 28, 2006) (BNA Court Docket); Int'l Union of Operating Eng'rs Local
825 v. Advantage Contracting & Envtl. Servs., No. 2:11-cv-05952 (D.N.J. Oct. 11, 2011),
(BNA Court Docket); Trs. of the NYC Dist. Council of Carpenter Pension Fund v. Metro

Furniture Servs., LLC, No. 1:11-cv-07013 (S.D.N.Y. Oct. 05, 2011) (BNA Court Docket);
Local Union No. 456 IBEW v. Bullet Elec., Inc., No. 2:11-cv-05690 (D.N.J. Sept. 30, 2011)
(BNA Court Docket); Elec. Workers Local 58 v. Lakes Elec. Co., No. 2:10-cv-13193 (E.D.
Mich. Aug. 12, 2010) (BNA Court Docket).
294.

See, e.g., Int'l Union of Operating Eng'rs Local 825 v. R.E. Pierson Constr., Co., No.

1:11-cv-07469 (D.N.J. Dec. 23, 2011) (BNA Court Docket); Int'l Union of Operating Eng'rs
Local 825 v. Statewide Hiway, No. 1:10-cv-00386 (D.N.J. Jan. 22, 2010) (BNA Court Docket);
Int'l Union of Operating Eng'rs Local 825 v. Advantage Contracting & Envtl. Servs., No.

2:11-cv-05952 (D.N.J. Oct. 11, 2011), (BNA Court Docket); Trs. of the NYC Dist. Council of
Carpenter

Pension

Fund

v.

Metro

Furniture

Servs.,

LLC,

No.

1:11-cv-07013

(S.D.N.Y. Oct. 05, 2011) (BNA Court Docket).
295. Dist. Council of Iron Workers v. Production Res. Grp., No. 3:03-cv-00149 (N.D. Cal.
Jan 10, 2003) (BNA Court Docket) (finding stageworkers were performing ironworker's
work).

496

FLORIDA STATE UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 48:443

ERISA (or any other law). 296 As shown in Table 7, when we exclude the
twenty-one ERISA cases from the total of thirty-six awards addressing
statutory claims that do not cite authority, the difference in likelihood
of arbitrators citing external authority in cases involving statutory
claims becomes statistically significant at the 1% level. This finding is
consistent with our prediction.

TABLE 7
External Authority

No External Authority

9

37.50%

15

62.50%

90

16.16%

467

83.84%

Statutory

Claim
(N=24)
No Statutory

Claim
(N=557)

Note: The difference in likelihood of arbitrators citing external authority in cases involving statutory claims is statistically significant at the
1% level for both statutory claim cases and no statutory claim cases.
Based on this analysis, we weakly conclude that labor arbitrators
more often cite external authority in cases involving a statutory claim
than in those involving a contractual breach. Further, the analysis
reveals that in some number of non-statutory cases, arbitrators are
also citing external authority. This makes sense given that many
terms in any agreement, including the CBA, will be vague and require
assistance in order to give it meaning. Consider, for example,
requirements of just cause, good faith, reasonableness, and safety.
Moreover, as discussed earlier, some CBA provisions incorporate
obligations that parallel statutory rights. Because the frequency of
citation to external authority is small, our findings support Allen and
Jennings conclusion that "[i]n the majority of arbitration cases," the
law has no bearing on the issue and many arbitrators believe that they
should "restrict themselves merely to examination of the labor
agreement." 297 However, in approximately 16% of awards that did not
involve a statutory issue (90 of the 557), labor arbitrators did cite
external authority. That is a significant minority, supporting the
opinion embraced by Mittenthal, and more recently Malin, that
arbitrators must consider external authority in some situations. 298

296. United Steelworkers of Am. v. Kelsey-Hayes Co., No. 4:11-cv-15497 (E.D. Mich.
2011) (BNA Court Docket).
297. Allen & Jennings, supra note 196, at 428.
298. Malin, supra note 106, at 14.
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2. Citation to External Authority is Lower in CBA Discrimination
Claims and Higher in Just Cause Claims
We also examined whether certain types of CBA claims cite to
external authority more often than others. We hypothesized that
claims dealing with nondiscrimination provisions would be more likely
to cite to external authority than would those dealing with other CBA
provisions, because the nondiscrimination provisions overlap so
heavily with statutory rights. To test this hypothesis, we compared
disputes based on nondiscrimination with disputes based on any other
breach of a collective bargaining agreement. We hypothesized the
same for disputes based on seniority provisions, due to their overlap
with FMLA leave, and for disputes based on harassment and refusal
to accommodate, also due to overlap with statutory protections. 299
As reflected in Table 8, the vast majority of the awards in our database allege at least one violation of the CBA. 300 There is no statistically
significant difference between the rate at which awards involving at
least one violation of the CBA and those that do not, a total of thirtyseven awards, cite to external authority. A total of 565 awards allege
a violation of the CBA, with eighty-eight awards citing external
authority and 477 awards not citing external authority. We coded
these awards for whether the breach alleged was a breach of a just
cause provision, a nondiscrimination provision, or a seniority
provision. 301

TABLE 8
External Authority

No External Authority

Collective
Bargaining
Agreement
Breach
(N=565)

88

15.58%

477

84.42%

No Collective
Bargaining
Agreement
Breach
(N=37)

11

29.73%

26

70.27%

299.

See generally Malin & Vonhof, supra note 206, at 200, 213, 227, 232-33.

300.

For prior reporting of this data, see Levinson et al., supra note 7, at 1876.

301. The other CBA awards addressed non-unit employees performing work, including
subcontracting cases, failure to pay into a fringe benefit fund, other benefits issues, including
leave, and wages or compensation, including overtime pay.
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Contrary to our expectations, as shown in Table 9,302 only four of
the awards involved a non-discrimination provision, and none of those
awards cited any external legal authority-an astonishing result. That
said, four awards is much too small a number to draw firm conclusions.
Perhaps employees with nondiscrimination claims are adhering to
raising statutory theories for relief rather than relying on the CBA.
And, in general, employees suffering from discrimination may be
electing to bring administrative charges or lawsuits rather than
pursuing a grievance in arbitration.

TABLE 9
External Authority

No External Authority

Nondiscrimination
(N=4)

0

0.00%

4

100.00%

Other Collective
Bargaining
Agreement Breach
(N=565)

88

15.58%

477

84.42%

Those cases alleging breach of a seniority clause also yielded results
that contradicted our hypothesis. As shown in Table 10, and previously
reported, only three of the eighty-eight cases citing external authority
involved a breach of a seniority provision (approximately 15%), and
seventeen of the 477 of those that did not cite external authority
involved a breach of a seniority provision. 303 In comparison, eightyseven of all breach of CBA claims cite external authority
(approximately 16%), and the difference is not statistically significant.

TABLE 10
External Authority

No External Authority

Seniority
(N=20)

3

15.00%

17

85.00%

Other Collective
Bargaining
Agreement
Breach
(N=555)

87

15.68%

468

84.32%

302.

See Levinson et al., supra note 7, at 1878.

303. Id.
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We also were interested in harassment and refusal to accommodate
claims. To investigate these, we coded for cases that involved an
adverse action, where an employee was denied something promised or
to which the employee was entitled, or the employee was harassed,
punished, terminated, suspended, laid off, forced to resign, not
promoted, not accommodated, or not hired. Three hundred ninetynine of the 602 awards were of this type. Seventy-five of the ninetynine awards that cite external authority involved an adverse action.
Three hundred twenty-four of the 503 awards that do not cite external
authority involved an adverse action.
We expected that cases involving harassment and refusals to
accommodate would cite external authority at a higher rate than cases
involving other adverse actions because there is statutory and case
law, from Title VII, the ADA, and similar state laws, that can be drawn
upon to help determine when harassment and when refusals to
accommodate are unlawful. As shown in Table 11, and previously
reported, of the seven cases alleging harassment, only one cited
external authority (approximately 14% of the cases involving
harassment). 304 Of those alleging other types of adverse actions,
seventy-five cited external authority (approximately 19%). As shown
in Table 12, and previously reported, of the twelve cases alleging a
refusal to accommodate,
only two cite external authority
(approximately 17%). Of those alleging other types of adverse actions,
seventy-four (approximately 19%) cite external authority. 305 These
differences were not statistically significant, suggesting that these
case types do not determine whether arbitrators cite external
authority.

TABLE 11
Harassment Alleged
(N=7)

External Authority

No External Authority

1

14.29%

6

85.71%

75

18.80%

324

81.20%

Other Adverse Action

Alleged
(N=399)

304.

Levinson et al., supra note 7, at 1880.

305. Id.
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TABLE 12
External Authority

No External Authority

Refusal to Accommodate Alleged (N=12)

2

16.67%

10

83.33%

Other Adverse Action
Alleged (N=396)

74

18.69%

322

81.31%

The cases involving a breach of a just cause provision actually
referred to external authority at a statistically significant higher rate
than awards addressing other types of breach of a CBA. One of us
expected the reverse to be true because a just cause provision is a
contractual guarantee without a statutory equivalent, unlike a clause,
such as a non-discrimination clause, for which there are many similar
statutory guarantees of non-discrimination. On the other hand, one of
us (the contracts law scholar) expected the opposite result because just
cause provisions are incredibly vague and require comparisons with
other cases in order to provide the clause with meaning. As shown
in Table 13, and previously reported, forty-three of the 208
awards addressing a just cause provision cite external authority
(approximately 21%) while fifty of the 372 awards addressing other
types of breach of the collective bargaining agreement (approximately
13%) refer to external authority.30 6 This difference is statistically
significant at the 5% level. Perhaps when a discharge is at issue,
arbitrators are more likely to cite external authority to buttress the
strength of their decision because the consequences are seemingly
harsher than other adverse actions, such as a failure to promote or to
provide overtime pay. In the labor arbitration context, discharge is
considered the equivalent to "capital punishment," and employers
must follow fair procedures and have a very good reason to discharge
an employee. Thus, arbitrators may wish to explain the outcome in an
extremely thorough manner and rely on external authority to do so.
On the other hand, our contracts scholar author finds arbitrator
reliance on external authority to be entirely consistent with judicial
treatment of vague, yet important, employment contract provisions.

306. Id. at 1879.
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TABLE 13
Just Cause
(N=208)

External Authority

No External Authority

43

165

20.67%

79.33%

Other Collective Bargaining
Agreement
Breach
(N=372)

50 13.44%
322 86.56%
Note: The difference between citation to external authority between
just cause cases and other CBA cases is significant at the 5% level for
both just cause cases and other collective bargaining agreement
breach.

CONCLUSION

Labor arbitration is broadly lauded as a mechanism that furthers
workplace harmony through quick, inexpensive, and private
resolution of disputes by industry experts who assist labor and
management in the evolution of their private governance system. Over
time, statutory rights for individual employees have proliferated, and
currently, they sit alongside and are embedded into collective
bargaining agreements. Today, those workplace agreements can force
employees to labor arbitration for enforcement of their statutory
rights, effectively foreclosing their resort to courts. Is private
arbitration sufficiently robust to protect these individual rights? What
about other employment protections that could be strengthened by
reference to external legal authority? The answers to these questions
turn on multiple factors, one of which is whether labor arbitrators
recognize, understand, and apply the public laws that protect
employees. To date, most empirical studies suggest that labor
arbitrators broadly cite to relevant legal authority, especially in civil
rights and discrimination cases. Those studies provide a small glimpse
into an essentially private mechanism through the study of available
labor arbitrations to date. For a variety of reasons as we have
discussed, prior available awards are not representative of labor
arbitration as a whole, and so, the picture they paint is also
unrepresentative of reality.
This article has utilized the federal court filing system to obtain and
study several hundred arbitration awards now publicly available
through the PACER database.30 7 These awards enabled us to observe
a much broader set of arbitrations outside those that are publicly
provided by the parties or subject to enhanced federal agency scrutiny.
307.

See supra Section V.
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In our initial article, we reported our statistical findings and concluded
that, in most instances, labor arbitrators are not relying on or citing to
external authority.308 In this Article, we have drawn upon those
findings to address the broader, and perhaps more significant, issue of
"lawlessness" in arbitration. Our study of these awards contributes
substantially to the question of whether labor arbitration can
simultaneously provide private justice and vigorous enforcement of
public employment policy or whether its private nature renders labor
arbitration inherently "lawless."
Our data demonstrates that the overwhelming majority of awards
do not cite to external authority.3 09 We find that using a service
provider, specifically the AAA or FMCS, correlates with a greater
likelihood of awards citing to external authority than awards that
result from a non-administrated process. We also find that
representation of one or both parties by an attorney correlates with a
greater likelihood of awards citing to external authority. 310 Perhaps
these findings have implications for the attributes of the labor
arbitration process needed in order to vigorously protect statutory
rights.
We also document, as anticipated, that a statistically significant
higher percentage of the awards that cite external authority than
those that do not are cases addressing statutory issues, but this is
evident only after unpacking various claims types in the data. 311 In
addition, the awards addressing claims asserting a breach of good
cause provision were more likely than other types of contractual claims
to cite to external authority, 312 which suggests that arbitrators are
more likely to consult external authority to inform vague clauses with
complex meaning. These areas of enhanced citation make sense and
suggest that some labor arbitrators understand the proper role of
external authority in private dispute resolution. However, our findings
indicate that the overall use of external authority is much lower than
prior studies indicate, even in these areas where external authority is
most valuable to just outcomes.
Our new data set will enable a series of future studies into labor
arbitration, including its use (or not) of prior arbitration awards as a
source of precedent. We will also be able to study post-arbitration
litigation, which seems to have expanded exponentially in recent
years, as well as whether citation to external authority affects the
308. Levinson et al., supra note 7, at 1882. Our heavy reliance on our initial article
wherein our initial statistical analysis was reported resulted in sometimes significant
textual overlap between the two articles. We have indicated the portions of this article that
heavily rely on the prior article in text or by footnoting.

309.
310.
311.
312.

See
See
See
See

supra Sections V.A.1 & 5.
supra Section V.B.2.
supra Section V.C.1.
supra Section V.C.2.
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deference subsequently granted to those awards by the federal courts.
In follow-up studies, we will more fully study labor arbitration
outcomes, including whether there is a repeat-player effect, whether
attorney representation affects win rates, and whether the arbitrator's
and parties' gender affects win rates. For now, we can say that labor
arbitration's paltry citation to external authority suggests that there
remains an inherent tension between private promotion of workplace
harmony and the vigorous protection of other public policies. More
studies are needed to help overcome the limitations of all data sets in
this field, including ours, and firm policy conclusions are not possible
at this time. But our data do indicate that we should not be sanguine
that labor arbitration is insulated from the "lawlessness" observed in
other arbitral contexts.
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APPENDIX A

Appendix A is an excerpt from the Agreement Between Walt Disney
World Co. & the Service Trades Council Union effective May 2, 2004April 28, 2007. It is available at Service Trades Council v. Walt Disney
World Co. (M.D.Fl. May 29, 2007) case 6:07-cv-00908-GAP-KRS
document #1 filed 05/29/07, available at https://www.bloomberglaw.com/document/X1Q6KNH31402.

ARTICLE 19 - GRIEVANCE PROCEDURE
SECTION 1. GRIEVANCES
PROCEDURE

SETTLED

ACCORDING

TO

The parties to this agreement agree that any grievance arising out of
the interpretation or application of the term of this Agreement, with
the exception of terminations, discipline based on an HR Compliance
investigation and policy grievances which will be expedited to Step 3,
shall be settled promptly in accordance with the following procedure.

SECTION 2. DEFINITIONS
(a) Grieve: A grievance within the meaning of this procedure is
defined as a dispute or difference of opinion between the parties
concerning the meaning, interpretation, application, or alleged
violation by the Company of this Agreement.
(b) Time Limits: The parties recognize that it is important that
grievance be processes and resolved as rapidly as possible: therefore,
the number of days indicated at each step of the grievance procedure
should be considered as a maximum, and every effort should be made
to expedite the process. All termination grievances will be given
priority for processing. The limits specified may be extended by mutual
agreement as evidenced by a waiver in writing signed by an authorized
representative of the Company and the Union, otherwise, the
grievance shall be regarded as withdrawn.
(c) Recording Device: The parties agree that no recording devices of
any kind shall be permitted or utilized during Step 1, 2, 3, or 4 of the
grievance procedures.
(d) Back-pay Awards: The parties agree that any Joint Standing
Committee or Arbitrator award of back pay shall be lessened by
unemployment compensation or any other compensation received by
the grievant during the period of termination prior to reinstatement.
(1) Back-pay awards for those employees in lipped
classifications, with the exception of Banquets and Dinner
Shows, will be paid at the appropriate Labor Grade 10 rate.
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(e) Information Requests: The company will make every reasonable
effort to provide any requested, relevant information regarding
grievance to the Union with seventy-two (72) hours. In circumstances
where the Company is unable to provide information within seventytwo (72) hours, the Union will be provided with an estimate of the time
of provision.

SECTION 3. GRIEVANCE PROCEDURE
Step 1. Any employee, believing that he/she has suffered a
grievance, shall discuss the matter with his/her immediate Guest
Service Manager. The employee may choose whether to discuss the
matter with his/her Guest Service Manager with or without the
assistance of his/her Union representative. In order to be deemed
timely, a grievance must be discussed by the employee with his/her
Union representative.
In order to be deemed timely, a grievance must be discussed by the
employee with his/her immediate Guest Service Manager within fourteen (14) calendar days after the employee has had a reasonable
opportunity to become aware of the occurance, whichever is later. The
employee must indicate that his/her discussion with, the Guest Service
Manager is a grievance. Failure to observe the aforementioned time
limitation shall be deemed a waiver and the grievance will be regarded
as abandoned.
The immediate Guest Service Manager shall give an oral reply
within three (3) calendar days after submission of the grievance. If the
immediate Guest Service Manager fails to give an oral reply within
the time limits provided, the grievance may be appealed to the next
Step of the grievance procedure.
Step 2. If the grievance shall not have been adjusted under Step 1,
then within seven (7) calendar days after the reply under STEP 1, the
grievance shall be reduced to writing upon the accepted Grievance
Form which shall set forth the relevant information concerning the
grievance, including a short description of the alleged grievance, the
date on which the grievance occurred and an identification of the
section of the Agreement alleged to have been violated and shall be
submitted to the employee's Area Manager who shall immediately
forward copies to Employee Relations. The Area Manager or his/her
designated representative and the Union representative or his/her
designated representative shall meet within seven (7) calendar days
after invocation of Step 2 in an attempt to settle the grievance. It shall
be incumbent upon the Union Representative to request such meeting.
The Area Manager or his/her designated representative shall provide
the employee and the Union representative with a written reply within
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five (5) days after the parties have met. If the Area Manager fails to
give a written reply within the time limits provided, the grievance may
be appealed to the next Step of the grievance procedure.
Step 3. If the grievance shall not have been adjusted under Step 2,
then within seven (7) calendar days from the date of the Area
Manager's written decision or a date when the decision or a date when
the decision should have been submitted by the Area Manager, the
grievance shall be presented in writing to designee, the Employee
Relations Representative, and the employees Union Business
Representative or his/her designee shall be held within twenty-one
(21) calendar days of the grievance. The General Manager/Director or
his/her designee shall provide the Union Business Representative or
his/her designee with a written reply with five (5) calendar days after
the parties have met. If the General Manager/Director or his/her
designee fails to give written reply within the time limit provided, the
grievance may be appealed to the next Step of the grievance procedure.
Step 4. If the grievance shall have been submitted but not adjusted
under Step 3, either party may within seven (7) calendar days after
receipt of the written reply request in writing that the grievance be
submitted to a Joint Standing Committee, which shall meet within
fourteen (14) calendar days of the appeal, unless extended by mutual
agreement of the Company and the Union.
The
Joint
Standing Committee
shall consist
of one
(1) representative of the Company and one (1) representative of the
affiliated Union(s).
The Joint Standing Committee shall meet at least twice per month
to investigate, review, and if necessary, conduct a hearing of all
outstanding grievances referred to it. Decisions of the Joint Standing
Committee shall be final and binding upon all partied at interest. The
Joint Standing Committee shall provide a written determination of all
cases reviewed within three (3) calendar days after it has met. If the
Joint Standing Committee is unable to resolve a grievance before it,
the grievance may be appealed to the next Step of the grievance
procedure.
The parties agree that upon notification of the Vice President of the
Employee Relations and the President of the Service Trades Council
Union, Step 4 of the grievance procedure may be waived and
grievances addressing institutional issues, affecting wither the Company or the Council, may be expedited to Step 5.
Step 5. If the grievance shall have been submitted but not adjusted
under Step 4, either party may within seven (7) calendar days after
receipt of the written reply request in writing that the grievance be
submitted to an Arbitrator mutually agreed upon by the Company and
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the Union. If agreement is reached, the arbitration must occur within
thirty (30) days after the joint selection of the arbitrator. If the
Company and the Union do not mutually agree upon the selection of
an Arbitrator, then an Arbitrator shall be selected from a panel of
seven (7) Arbitrators furnished by the Federal Mediation and
Conciliation Service. Either party, at their discretion may refuse one
list, which has been presented by a Federal Mediation and Conciliation
Service for a pending arbitration hearing. At this point, the parties
have a maximum of fourteen (14) calendar days from the date the list
is received to strike the panel. The Rules for the Federal Mediation
and Conciliation Service shall govern the selection of an Arbitrator and
the conduct of the arbitration hearing. The Arbitrator shall not have
the authority to alter, amend, change, modify, add to or subtract from,
or reform any provision, Article or language of this Agreement. The
Decision of the Arbitrator shall be final and binding on all parties with
no further appeal, except for reasons of setting aside an Arbitrator's
Award, as set forth in applicable Federal and Florida Statues. Any
joint expense incidental to or arising out of the arbitration shall be
borne equally by the Company and the appropriate Union. Only one
grievance shall be before a specific Arbitrator at one time.

SECTION 4. GRIEVANCE SETTLEMENTS
A grievance having been settled at any step of the grievance
procedure will be affected no more than seven (7) calendar days after
the date of the settlement.
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